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This study analyzes the determinants of loan and lease losses experienced by 
North American Bank Holding Companies in 2008, as a result of the credit crisis 
initially triggered by residential lending to high-risk borrowers. The performed analysis 
is based on financial information on Bank Holding Companies obtained from the 
Federal Reserve System and on macroeconomic data for the United States of America at 
national, regional and state levels. For both larger and smaller Bank Holding Companies, 
higher credit losses were associated with higher loan portfolio average spreads and 
higher shares of construction and land-related loans. The fact that the Bank Holding 
Company was audited by one of the “Big Four” auditing firms also proved to be 
relevant. Larger Bank Holding Companies’ credit losses were also found to be 
influenced by lower gross domestic product growth rates, higher proportions of 
restructured loans and higher shares of foreign loans. Larger housing price declines, 
lower shares of foreign loans and lower provisioning ratios of delinquent loans also 
resulted in higher credit losses for smaller Bank Holding Companies. 
This study also demonstrates that larger and listed Bank Holding Companies 
incurred in higher credit losses comparatively to smaller and unlisted Bank Holding 
Companies, respectively. Finally, it was found that Bank Holding Companies 
developing their activities in the West registered comparatively higher credit losses, 
while Bank Holding Companies developing their activities in the Northeast incurred in 
comparatively lower credit losses. 
 
Keywords: Bank Holding Companies, credit losses, subprime crisis, credit crisis, United 
States of America, 2008 





DETERMINANTES DAS PERDAS DE CRÉDITO INCORRIDAS PELAS 
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Carlos França 
Mestrado em: Finanças 




Este estudo analisa os factores determinantes das perdas de crédito incorridas 
pelas holdings bancárias Norte-Americanas em 2008, como resultado da crise do 
mercado de crédito inicialmente despoletada pela concessão de crédito hipotecário de 
alto risco. A análise efectuada baseia-se em informação financeira das holdings 
bancárias obtida junto da Federal Reserve System e em dados macroeconómicos para os 
Estados Unidos da América, aos níveis nacional, regional e estatal. Conjuntamente para 
as holdings bancárias de maior e de menor dimensões, perdas de crédito mais elevadas 
estão associadas a carteiras de crédito com spreads médios mais altos e a maiores 
proporções de empréstimos para construção e financiamento de terrenos. O facto de a 
holding bancária ter sido auditada por uma das “Big Four” também se revelou relevante. 
As perdas de crédito das holdings bancárias de maior dimensão foram ainda 
influenciadas por menores taxas de crescimento do produto interno bruto, maiores pesos 
de empréstimos reestruturados e maiores proporções de empréstimos ao estrangeiro. 
Maiores quedas dos preços dos imóveis para habitação, menores pesos de empréstimos 
ao estrangeiro e menores níveis de provisionamento do crédito vencido implicaram 
também maiores perdas de crédito para as holdings bancárias de menor dimensão. 
Este estudo demonstra ainda que as holdings bancárias de maior dimensão e as 
que são cotadas em bolsa incorreram em perdas de crédito mais elevadas face às 
holdings bancárias de menor dimensão e às que não são cotadas em bolsa, 
respectivamente. Finalmente, verificou-se que as holdings bancárias que desenvolvem 
as suas actividades no Oeste registaram perdas de crédito comparativamente mais 
elevadas, enquanto as holdings bancárias que desenvolvem as suas actividades no 
Nordeste incorreram em perdas de crédito comparativamente menores. 
 
Palavras-chave: holdings bancárias, perdas de crédito, crise do mercado de subprime, 
crise do mercado de crédito, Estados Unidos da América, 2008 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
BEA   Bureau of Economic Analysis 
BHC / BHCs  Bank Holding Company / Bank Holding Companies 
CAGR  Compound Annual Growth Rate 
ECB   European Central Bank 
EUR Euro, the single official currency of the European Union's 
Member States that make up the “euro area” 
FED   Federal Reserve System 
FHFA   Federal Housing Finance Agency 
GBP   Great British Pound, the currency of the United Kingdom 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
HPI   Housing Price Index 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
MBA   Mortgage Bankers Association 
NIC   National Information Center 
NDS   National Delinquency Survey 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
OTS   Office of Thrift Supervision 
UK   United Kingdom 
USA   United States of America 











Credit losses. The definition “credit losses” refers to losses faced by financial 
institutions in their loan portfolios. Several proxies can be used to measure credit losses, 
including proxies based on provisions for loan losses, net charge-offs and flow of new 
nonperforming loans. 
 
Credit score. A credit score is a number/grade representing a person’s creditworthiness 
or the likelihood of that person repaying his or her debts, being primarily based on a 
person’s debt-paying history/debt profile and on a statistical analysis of similar 
borrowers in terms of credit risk profile. 
 
Nonperforming loans. Generally, a loan is considered to be “nonperforming” if 
payments of interest and principal are past due by 90 days or more or, if those payments 
are less than 90 days overdue, there are reasons to doubt that owed amounts will be 
fully recovered. 
 
Owners’ equity in household real estate. Difference between (i) residential real estate 
assets’ valuation and (ii) related total debt outstanding. 
 
Prime loans. There isn’t a standard definition for what are prime loans and subprime 
loans. Conceptually, the former may be defined as mortgage loans carrying lower credit 
risk, based on borrowers’ creditworthiness and terms of mortgage contracts. 
 
Subprime loans. As opposed to prime loans, subprime loans are mortgage loans 
carrying higher credit risk. Generally, subprime loans are granted to borrowers with a 
previous record of delinquency, a low credit score and high debt service-to-income 
ratios and as a consequence subprime loans are subject to higher interest rates. 
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Back in the first semester of 2007, few could foresee that the subprime crisis 
could actually lead to a worldwide financial and economic crisis with an extent not 
experienced since the Great Depression. In June 2007, Ben Bernanke, FED’s Chairman, 
said that, up to then, “the troubles in the subprime sector seemed unlikely to seriously 
spill over to the broader economy or the financial system”
1
. A month later, Bernanke 
stated that subprime-related losses could cost up to USD 100 billion which, in case he 
was correct, would indeed confirm that subprime-related losses had a rather limited 
impact in the financial system. However, the problems in the subprime sector turned out 
to be the prelude of a crisis that would have a dramatic impact in the North American 
financial system and which ultimately dragged the world economy into a severe crisis. 
The financial crisis, which deepened in 2008, took its toll in financial institutions, 
mainly in the USA and Europe. The financial industry suffered significant losses related 
to its credit exposure and several large capital injections, in order to restore lost equity 
and to comply with regulatory requirements, occurred. 
But, what caused such a crisis? The answer to this question lies in several factors: 
failures of financial supervision authorities, credit rating agencies’ inability to correctly 
perceive the risks involved in complex financial instruments, economic agents’ 
overconfidence and, of course, banks’ lending practices. 
This study will focus on the factors that determined North American BHCs’ loan 
and lease losses in 2008. It will thus discuss the reasons behind the fact that credit loss 
experience was so dissimilar between North American BHCs, taking into consideration 
external and bank-specific factors. 
The performed analysis is based on a sample comprising 349 BHCs, for which it 
was obtained historical financial data from the FED, based on regulatory filings that 
BHCs have to submit periodically
2
. This data forms the backbone of the bank-specific 
determinants of credit losses considered in this study and, since it was obtained from a 
single information source, it mitigates data comparability issues across all BHCs. The 
data used for external determinants of credit losses was collected from recognized North 
American public entities (BEA and FHFA) at national, regional and state levels. 
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 BHC data obtained through the NIC, which is a central repository of financial data and institution 




This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background information 
on the recent evolution of the North American credit and housing markets, as well as a 
brief synopsis of the most relevant events concerning the credit crisis of 2007-2009. 
Section 2 aims to promote a brief review of the housing market crisis, discussing its 
importance on the beginning of the financial and economic crisis. In Section 3, a 
literature review is presented. This section will perform a revision of the determinants of 
banks’ credit loss experience presented in several relevant studies, separating between 
external determinants and bank-specific determinants of credit losses. 
Section 4 presents the methodology and characterizes the data, describing the 
external and bank-specific factors considered as determinants of BHCs’ credit losses. 
The sample of BHCs considered in this study is based on financial institutions classified, 
as of December 31
st




Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results for the used BHCs’ sample. 
A set of hypotheses tests with the purpose of assessing whether credit loss experience in 
2008 was similar across predefined BHCs’ groups is also performed. 
Finally, in Section 6 the study’s conclusions are presented. In addition, some 
suggestions for further investigation are also discussed. They are a consequence of some 
weakness of this study and/or some questions raised during the study’s preparation. 
  
                                                          
3
 These thresholds are defined according to BHCs’ total assets – Peer 1: total assets of USD 10 billion and 
over; Peer 2: total assets between USD 3 and 10 billion; Peer 3: total assets between USD 1 and 3 billion. 
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2. Evolution of the North American Credit and Housing Markets and the 2007-
2009 Credit Crisis 
 
2.1. Evolution of the North American Credit and Housing Markets 
 
It is common to associate the 2007-2009 credit crisis with the preceding housing 
market boom, which became more pronounced after 1999. The low level of interest 
rates observed mainly after 2001, as a response to the economic slowdown induced by 
the burst of the technology stocks’ bubble and the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 
2001, were a catalyst for housing prices appreciation, as North American families 
accessed to more affordable credit conditions
4
. According to the FHFA’s HPI Purchase-
Only Index
5
, the North American housing market peaked in the second quarter of 2007, 
having registered a CAGR of 7.3% between 2001 and 2006, which was substantially 
above the inflation rate for that same period
6
. After having reached a peak in the second 
quarter of 2007, the North American housing market registered a substantial contraction, 
with prices decreasing 8.2% in 2008 (once again, according to the FHFA’s HPI 
Purchase-Only Index). Based on data up to September 2009, the housing prices decline 
pace is decelerating in 2009
7
. However, the correction in the housing market may still 
not be over. 
The Government of the USA implemented several measures to mitigate the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis on families and companies, as well as to 
promote the country’s economic recovery. According to the BEA, in the third quarter of 
2009 real GDP in the USA increased at an annual rate of 2.8%. This increase was 
preceded by periods of substantial economic contraction, namely the fourth quarter of 
2008 and the first quarter of 2009, when real GDP registered an annual decrease of 5.5% 
and 6.6%, respectively. 
                                                          
4
 The homeownership rate for the USA increased steadily from 66.9% at the end of 1999 to 69.2% in the 
second quarter of 2004, when homeownership peaked in the USA. As of September 2009, the 
homeownership rate for the USA was at 67.6% (source: U.S. Census Bureau). 
5
 The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices are also well-known among the housing market observers. In 
this study, it was decided to use the FHFA’s HPI Purchase-Only Index mainly because apparently the 
latter has a broader geographic coverage than the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices. More detail on 
this matter can be found at http://www.fhfa.gov. 
6
 Inflation rates for the USA between 2001 and 2006 ranged from a minimum of 1.6% to a maximum of 
3.4% (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers). 
7
 In the third quarter of 2009, the FHFA’s HPI Purchase-Only Index registered a slight increase compared 
to the previous quarter (approximately 0.2%), but still down approximately 4% compared to price levels 
observed in the third quarter of 2008. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the North American housing market prices, as 
measured by the FHFA’s HPI Purchase-Only Index, for the period between 1991 and 
September 2009. Associated with the financial and economic crisis, housing market 
prices in the USA decreased to levels registered in the first quarter of 2005. As of 
September 2009, the accumulated depreciation of housing prices since the market peak 
is approximately 10.7% (based on FHFA’s HPI Purchase-Only Index). 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the FHFA's HPI Purchase-Only Index (seasonally-adjusted). 
The left vertical axis illustrates the evolution of the HPI Purchase-Only Index, while the 
right vertical axis measures the trailing 12 month growth rate of the HPI Purchase-Only 
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The housing market performance was significantly different across the USA. The 
states that registered a better performance during the housing market’s boom, registered 
(in general) the most relevant downward movements afterwards. Table 1 resumes 
housing market performance by state. The states of Arizona, California, Florida and 
Nevada were particularly hit in the housing market downturn, as it can be seen in Table 
1. For instance, in Nevada housing prices went down to levels not seen since the first 
quarter of 2002, while in California the financial and economic crisis has led prices to 
levels near those registered in the first quarter of 2003
8
. The housing market crisis was 
not so intense in the states of Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota 
and Texas. In those states, housing prices were actually able to increase since June 2007 
                                                          
8
 Source: FHFA. 
12 
 
(period in which housing market prices peaked in the USA, as measured by the FHFA’s 
HPI Purchase-Only Index). 
 
Table 1. Housing market performance by state. 













Alaska 2009Q1 68.2% -5.4% -3.1%
Alabama 2007Q3 40.5% -3.7% -3.6%
Arkansas 2007Q2 38.5% -5.6% -5.6%
Arizona 2006Q4 105.6% -36.0% -34.5%
California 2006Q1 126.6% -40.0% -35.8%
Colorado 2007Q1 29.0% -3.0% -2.8%
Connecticut 2007Q1 68.4% -9.7% -9.4%
District of Columbia 2007Q2 159.5% -9.0% -9.0%
Delaware 2007Q2 81.7% -10.5% -10.5%
Florida 2006Q4 119.1% -36.5% -35.2%
Georgia 2007Q2 32.3% -10.0% -10.0%
Hawaii 2007Q2 131.1% -11.3% -11.3%
Iowa 2007Q3 27.5% -0.2% 0.3%
Idaho 2007Q3 70.7% -12.2% -11.7%
Illinois 2007Q1 47.2% -9.6% -8.9%
Indiana 2007Q2 18.8% -4.8% -4.8%
Kansas 2009Q3 31.3% 0.0% 0.7%
Kentucky 2007Q4 28.6% -1.4% -1.1%
Louisiana 2007Q3 51.0% -2.5% -1.5%
Massachusetts 2005Q4 62.1% -12.3% -7.9%
Maryland 2007Q1 119.7% -15.9% -15.8%
Maine 2007Q4 68.4% -4.6% -4.0%
Michigan 2005Q4 17.1% -23.3% -16.9%
Minnesota 2006Q2 47.4% -12.7% -12.1%
Missouri 2007Q1 37.2% -5.7% -5.5%
Mississippi 2007Q1 37.2% -3.8% -3.2%
Montana 2008Q1 79.7% -4.5% -2.5%
North Carolina 2008Q2 39.4% -3.4% -1.5%
North Dakota 2009Q2 58.1% -2.0% 3.9%
Nebraska 2007Q2 23.6% -2.3% -2.3%
New Hampshire 2005Q4 63.3% -13.5% -11.2%
New Jersey 2006Q2 95.0% -11.8% -11.4%
New Mexico 2008Q1 67.9% -7.3% -6.9%
Nevada 2006Q1 114.0% -49.2% -46.6%
New York 2007Q2 73.3% -4.6% -4.6%
Ohio 2006Q1 18.3% -8.0% -7.0%
Oklahoma 2009Q3 37.3% 0.0% 4.2%
Oregon 2007Q2 84.3% -14.6% -14.6%
Pennsylvania 2007Q2 67.2% -4.6% -4.6%
Rhode Island 2006Q2 101.3% -17.7% -12.9%
South Carolina 2008Q1 38.5% -2.2% -2.0%
South Dakota 2009Q2 41.0% -0.9% 3.0%
Tennessee 2007Q3 38.2% -4.8% -4.8%
Texas 2008Q3 33.9% 0.0% 1.8%
Utah 2007Q3 65.5% -15.9% -15.2%
Virginia 2007Q2 88.7% -12.5% -12.5%
Vermont 2007Q3 74.2% -1.5% -0.3%
Washington 2007Q3 80.6% -12.7% -12.4%
Wisconsin 2007Q2 37.4% -4.7% -4.7%
West Virginia 2008Q4 42.1% -4.3% -0.8%
Wyoming 2008Q1 82.3% -4.9% -3.4%
1
 Accumulated appreciation between the last quarter of 2000 and the period in which the peak was reached.
2
 Accumulated depreciation between the period in which the peak was reached and September 2009.
3




Similarly to the housing market, the USA also experienced a significant credit 
expansion in the years that preceded the financial and economic crisis, especially after 
2001. Once again, this was mainly driven by lower interest rates. Between 1997 and 
2006, total debt outstanding to nonfinancial sectors expanded at a CAGR of 7.7% 
(CAGR of 9.0% for the period 2001-2006)
9
. Credit to residential real estate enjoyed 
even more significant growth rates during that period, having total debt outstanding 
related to home mortgages registered a CAGR of 11.5% between 1997 and 2006 
(CAGR of 13.0% for the period 2001-2006)
 10
. 
From 2007 onwards, banks clearly changed their lending practices as a response 
to the developments of the financial and economic crisis, being particularly felt in the 
residential real estate sector. In fact, overall credit growth in the nonfinancial sectors 
experienced a relevant slowdown, while total debt outstanding related to home 
mortgages actually declined in 2008 and up to the third quarter of 2009. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the evolution of both total debt outstanding to 
nonfinancial sectors and total debt outstanding related to home mortgages, respectively, 
for the period between 1997 and the third quarter of 2009. Those figures show that 
credit lending has clearly decreased after 2007. It is interesting to note that credit 
growth in 2008 and 2009 (up to the third quarter) went significantly below the observed 
levels during the last recession (2001-2002), notwithstanding the efforts of the United 
States Government in trying to make more lending available to economic agents. The 




                                                          
9
 Source: The FED, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States” (3
rd
 quarter of 2009). 
10
 Source: The FED, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States” (3
rd
 quarter of 2009). 
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Figure 2. Evolution of total debt outstanding to nonfinancial sectors. 
Source: The FED, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States” (3
rd
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Figure 3. Evolution of total debt outstanding related to home mortgages. 
Source: The FED, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States” (3
rd
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Housing prices’ depreciation led to a considerable decrease of owners’ equity in 
household real estate. Owners’ equity, expressed as a percentage of household real 
estate, stood at relatively stable levels for the period 1997-2006 (average of 59.0%), 
registering, since then, a significant decrease to 37.6% as of September 2009. During 
the period between December 2006 and September 2009, total owners’ equity in the 
USA has decreased by USD 6,904 billion (approximately 52.6%). Figure 4 depicts the 
evolution of owners’ equity in household real estate for the period between 1997 and 




Figure 4. Evolution of owners’ equity in household real estate. 
Source: The FED, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States” (3
rd


















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Q3
Household Real Estate (USD Billions) Owners' Equity in Household Real Estate (USD Billions)
Owners' Equity as a Percentage of Household Real Estate
 
 
As in any other economic recession, banks’ assets quality fell considerably. 
Charge-offs (loans removed from banks’ balance sheets and charged against loan loss 
reserves) and delinquency rates (figure which accounts for loans facing repayment 
difficulties still registered in banks’ balance sheets) increased dramatically, especially 
since the beginning of 2008. This fact illustrates that difficulties initially felt in the real 
estate sector rapidly spread to the remainder of the economy and to less riskier 
borrowers. Although the economy of the USA presented signs of recovery in the third 
quarter of 2009, banks still faced an increase in charge-offs and delinquency rates in 
that same period, in general to record levels for more than 20 years, according to data 
from the FED. Figures 5 and 6 depict the evolution of charge-off rates and delinquency 
rates, respectively, for the period between 1987 and September 2009. 
Consumer loans were the most charged-off business segment by North American 
banks in the context of the 2007-2009 credit crisis. In the third quarter of 2009, it was 
registered an annualized net of recoveries charge-off rate of approximately 5.9% for 
consumer loans, well above remaining presented business segments in Figure 5. It is 
also interesting to note that for real estate loans the annualized charge-off rate in the 
third quarter of 2009 achieved a level (circa 2.4%) corresponding to almost the double 
of the worst charge-off level verified in past crises for the last 23 years. This is clearly 
symptomatic of this crisis’ seriousness, since real estate loans, given their collaterals, 
typically are assets with relatively low charge-off rates. 
16 
 
According to Figure 6, delinquency rates have also increased substantially, 
especially from the last quarter of 2007 onwards. With the exception of C&I loans
11
, 
presented business segments achieved record levels for delinquency rates for more than 
20 years. In order to better appreciate the impact of the 2007-2009 credit crisis in North 
American banks’ assets quality, the average delinquency rate for total loans and leases 
between 1987 and September 2009 stood at approximately 3.3%, corresponding to less 
than half of the delinquency rate observed in the third quarter of 2009, which has 
reached to 7.0%. Even during the recession of 1990-1991, when the previous highest 
delinquency rate since 1987 was reached, total loans and leases’ delinquency rate didn’t 
surpass 6.2%. 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of charge-off rates for insured United States-chartered commercial 
banks (seasonally-adjusted). 
Charge-offs are measured net of recoveries as an annualized percentage of average 
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11
 The expression “C&I loans” stands for “Commercial and Industrial loans”. 
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Figure 6. Evolution of delinquency rates for insured United States-chartered 
commercial banks (seasonally-adjusted). 
Delinquency rates consider past due loans for thirty days or more and still accruing 
interest as well as nonaccruing loans, and are measured as a percentage of end-of-period 
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Focusing solely in mortgage loans, and based on MBA’s NDS, it is clear that 
delinquency rates have increased steadily from the fourth quarter of 2007 onwards. 
Delinquency rates for subprime loans have risen to approximately 26.4% as of 
September 2009, while delinquency rates for prime loans have risen to circa 6.8% as of 
that same date. The credit crisis turned out to have such severe consequences that even 
prime loans’ delinquency rates have almost tripled compared to the average levels 
registered for the period 2003-2006. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of mortgage loans’ 






Figure 7. Evolution of delinquency rates for mortgage loans (seasonally-adjusted). 
Delinquency rates consider past due loans for thirty days or more and are calculated as a 
percentage of the number of loans serviced (NDS reports do not collect information on 



















2002Q4 2003Q2 2003Q4 2004Q2 2004Q4 2005Q2 2005Q4 2006Q2 2006Q4 2007Q2 2007Q4 2008Q2 2008Q4 2009Q2
All Loans Prime Loans Subprime Loans
 
 
Not surprisingly, the states in which occurred the largest housing price declines 
were also generally the ones with the largest increases in delinquency rates. Table 2 
presents the evolution of delinquency rates by state between June 2007 (peak for the 
North American housing prices) and September 2009. According to the performed 
analysis, delinquency rates in the states of Arizona and Nevada have more than tripled 
in the covered period, whilst in California it has almost tripled. 
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 NDS reports are estimated to cover approximately 85% of the outstanding first-lien residential 
mortgages in the USA. 
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Table 2. Evolution of delinquency rates for mortgage loans by state. 
Delinquency rates consider past due loans for thirty days or more, and are calculated as 
a percentage of the number of loans serviced. Source: MBA, NDS reports. 
 
All Loans Prime Loans Subprime Loans
State 2007Q2 2009Q3 2007Q2 2009Q3 2007Q2 2009Q3
Alaska 3.2% 5.1% 2.0% 3.4% 6.8% 11.7%
Alabama 6.2% 11.1% 3.5% 7.4% 16.8% 30.7%
Arkansas 5.4% 9.0% 2.8% 5.8% 15.6% 27.2%
Arizona 3.6% 11.9% 1.8% 9.4% 10.2% 27.1%
California 3.6% 10.5% 1.9% 8.8% 12.6% 26.0%
Colorado 3.9% 6.7% 1.9% 4.3% 11.0% 19.1%
Connecticut 4.1% 8.7% 2.1% 5.6% 14.2% 28.2%
District of Columbia 3.7% 7.4% 2.2% 5.6% 13.7% 22.9%
Delaware 4.0% 8.6% 2.4% 5.5% 12.7% 25.3%
Florida 5.2% 12.2% 2.9% 9.5% 14.0% 24.2%
Georgia 6.9% 12.9% 3.5% 8.5% 17.2% 29.3%
Hawaii 2.4% 6.7% 1.4% 4.9% 8.6% 21.1%
Iowa 4.2% 6.9% 2.6% 4.6% 14.5% 25.1%
Idaho 3.1% 7.8% 1.6% 5.7% 10.2% 23.5%
Illinois 5.1% 10.5% 2.5% 7.0% 15.3% 28.9%
Indiana 7.0% 11.8% 3.6% 7.2% 16.0% 28.7%
Kansas 4.6% 7.5% 2.5% 4.9% 13.1% 23.5%
Kentucky 5.7% 9.6% 3.0% 5.8% 15.2% 25.2%
Louisiana 7.3% 10.9% 4.0% 6.8% 17.7% 27.6%
Massachusetts 4.5% 9.3% 2.6% 6.7% 17.0% 32.2%
Maryland 4.2% 10.0% 2.1% 6.9% 13.8% 29.3%
Maine 4.7% 8.8% 2.6% 6.1% 14.6% 25.1%
Michigan 7.6% 12.6% 4.0% 8.3% 20.8% 33.5%
Minnesota 3.9% 7.0% 2.2% 5.2% 14.6% 23.8%
Missouri 5.6% 9.4% 2.8% 5.9% 17.2% 29.6%
Mississippi 9.3% 14.4% 4.9% 9.3% 21.5% 34.9%
Montana 2.6% 5.3% 1.6% 3.7% 9.9% 23.2%
North Carolina 5.5% 9.7% 3.0% 6.3% 15.5% 27.7%
North Dakota 2.8% 4.0% 1.9% 2.8% 10.9% 20.6%
Nebraska 4.3% 6.4% 2.5% 4.2% 13.1% 22.6%
New Hampshire 4.3% 8.5% 2.5% 6.1% 15.1% 29.0%
New Jersey 4.3% 9.0% 2.5% 6.4% 13.5% 25.3%
New Mexico 3.7% 7.8% 2.1% 5.5% 10.9% 22.8%
Nevada 4.4% 14.0% 2.4% 12.0% 11.6% 26.4%
New York 4.5% 8.8% 2.6% 5.9% 12.1% 25.6%
Ohio 6.7% 10.7% 3.5% 6.6% 15.8% 26.6%
Oklahoma 5.3% 8.4% 2.8% 5.1% 12.5% 22.3%
Oregon 2.4% 6.6% 1.4% 4.8% 8.7% 21.9%
Pennsylvania 5.6% 9.2% 3.0% 5.7% 15.0% 26.5%
Rhode Island 5.0% 10.3% 2.6% 7.5% 16.5% 30.2%
South Carolina 5.7% 9.9% 3.3% 6.8% 15.6% 26.9%
South Dakota 3.0% 4.5% 2.0% 2.9% 12.0% 21.0%
Tennessee 6.6% 11.1% 3.0% 6.6% 17.3% 30.4%
Texas 6.5% 9.8% 2.9% 5.3% 14.7% 25.2%
Utah 3.5% 8.4% 1.9% 6.0% 8.6% 23.6%
Virginia 3.7% 7.7% 1.9% 5.2% 13.4% 26.5%
Vermont 3.2% 5.5% 2.0% 4.1% 13.0% 24.3%
Washington 2.6% 6.9% 1.4% 4.8% 9.4% 25.1%
Wisconsin 4.0% 7.7% 2.2% 5.1% 14.7% 27.4%
West Virginia 6.8% 10.3% 4.5% 7.3% 18.1% 27.0%
Wyoming 2.5% 5.5% 1.4% 3.3% 9.4% 21.7%
 
 
The empirical relation between changes of housing prices and delinquency rates 
for mortgage loans across North American states is quite strong, as it can be seen in 
Figure 8. This figure depicts the evolution of both FHFA’s HPI Purchase-Only Index 




Figure 8. Evolution of housing prices and mortgage loans’ delinquency rates across 
North American states between June 2007 and September 2009. 
Each dot refers to a North American state. The equation and the R-squared displayed on 
the chart are for the linear regression between the change of the FHFA’s HPI Purchase-
Only Index and the evolution of mortgage loans’ delinquency rate. Source: Own 
elaboration based on data provided by FHFA and MBA. 
 













































HPI - Purchase-Only Index: Change Between 2007Q2 - 2009Q3
 
 
In this section it was presented a brief analysis of the recent evolution of the North 
American credit and housing markets, as well as the existing relation between housing 
prices’ depreciation and the increase of mortgage loans’ delinquency rates. In the next 
section it will be presented a brief synopsis of the most relevant facts concerning the 
credit crisis of 2007-2009. 
 
2.2. The 2007-2009 Credit Crisis 
 
The 2007-2009 credit crisis was triggered by high-risk borrowers’ difficulties in 
meeting their mortgage loans repayments. General conviction during the first semester 
of 2007 was that difficulties experienced in the subprime sector would not seriously 
affect the broader economy. Nevertheless, mainly from the second semester of 2008 
onwards, it rapidly spread to less riskier borrowers and to the remainder of the economy. 
The contagion was evident, worldwide and very fast. The purpose of this section is to 
present the main events of the 2007-2009 credit crisis. It was based on available public 
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 February 2007: HSBC announces that its credit losses for 2006 
would be 20% higher than initially expected, as a result of housing 
market difficulties in the USA. This constituted the first major sign 
of difficulties in the North American subprime market. Also in 
February 2007, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”) announces that it would cease buying riskier 
subprime mortgages; 
 April 2007: New Century Financial, one of the top subprime lenders 
in the USA, files for protection from creditors (“Chapter 11”); 






 August 2007: American Home Mortgage, once one of the Top 10 
mortgage lenders in the USA, files for Chapter 11. European bank 
BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds worth EUR 2 billion, 
due to problems in the North American subprime market. As a 
result, the credit markets freeze, which leads the ECB to inject EUR 
95 billion into the euro area banking system; 
 September 2007: The Bank of England is authorized to provide 
liquidity support for Northern Rock, UK’s fifth-largest mortgage 
lender, after the bank’s request for emergency financial support; 
 October 2007: Ben Bernanke warns housing market crisis will 
lower GDP growth forecasts for the USA in 2008; 
 December 2007: Joint action of the FED, the ECB and from the 
central banks of Canada, Switzerland and UK, with the purpose of 





 January 2008: The World Bank projects global economic growth to 
slow down as a result of the credit crisis. Global stock markets fall 
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Time Period Events 
sharply and as a response the FED lowers interest rates by 75 basis 
points, which was followed by an additional interest rate cut of 50 
basis points only a few days later. Still in January 2008, Bank of 
America announces the acquisition of Countrywide Financial, a 
large North American lender that was facing financial difficulties 
since the beginning of the second semester of 2007; 
 February 2008: The UK’s Government announces the 
nationalization of Northern Rock; 
 March 2008: JPMorgan Chase announces the acquisition of Bear 
Stearns, at that time the fifth-largest investment bank in the USA, in 
a deal backed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; 
 April 2008: The IMF estimates potential losses from the credit crisis 
to reach at least USD 945 billion and alerts to the growing 





 July 2008: The Government of the USA announces several 
measures to support Freddie Mac and the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”). Still in July 2008, IndyMac 
Bank, F.S.B. is closed by the OTS; 
 September 2008: The FHFA places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
government conservatorship. Together, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac own or guarantee approximately half of total residential 
mortgages outstanding in the USA. Also in September 2008, 
Lehman Brothers (at that time the fourth-largest investment bank in 
the USA) files for Chapter 11. This proved to be one of the most 
disruptive events of the 2007-2009 credit crisis, since financial and 
economic conditions considerably worsened afterwards. One day 
after Lehman Brothers had filed for Chapter 11, the Federal Reserve 
Board authorized the lending of up to USD 85 billion to the 
American International Group (“AIG”) in return for a stake of 80% 
in the firm. Still in September 2008, the OTS closed Washington 
Mutual Bank, having JPMorgan Chase acquired its banking 
operations, and Citigroup bided for the banking operations of 
23 
 
Time Period Events 
Wachovia Corporation. In Europe, Fortis was partially nationalized 
in a joint move by the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
Bradford & Bingley was nationalized by the UK’s Government and 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg intervened in Dexia; 
 October 2008: Governments worldwide announce plans to intervene 
in the financial system. In the USA, the House of Representatives 
approves a USD 700 billion plan (known as the “Troubled Asset 
Relief Program”), with the purpose of acquiring toxic assets from 
financial institutions and which included a USD 250 billion facility 
to acquire stakes in North American banks in the form of preferred 
stock investments. Capital injections in banks worldwide continue: 
the UK’s Government invests a total of GBP 37 billion in Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HBOS. Iceland, one of the most 
severely hit countries by the credit crisis of 2007-2009, takes 
control of its banking system, by nationalizing the country’s most 
relevant banks. Back to the USA, Wells Fargo acquires Wachovia 
Corporation, thus frustrating Citigroup’s move in the end of the 
previous month, and PNC Financial Services Group Inc. acquires 
National City Corporation; 
 November 2008: The IMF approves a USD 16.4 billion loan to 
Ukraine and a USD 2.1 billion loan to Iceland. The Government of 
the USA injects USD 20 billion in Citigroup, after its shares lost 
more than 60% of its value in only one week. Additionally, the FED 
announces a USD 800 billion plan aimed to stabilize the financial 
system and to make more lending available to consumers, while the 
European Commission presents a EUR 200 billion economic 
recovery plan. Still in November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board 
approves the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America; 
 December 2008: The FED cuts its key interest rate to a range of 0% 
to 0.25% (the lowest on record). The Government of the USA 
announces it will provide a total of USD 17.4 billion in loans to the 
national car industry and a few days later the Treasury Department 
24 
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 January 2009: The Irish Government nationalizes the Anglo Irish 
Bank, while the Government of the USA invests a further USD 20 
billion in Bank of America; 
 March 2009: The Government of the USA invests a further USD 30 
billion in AIG and the FED announces that it will buy 
approximately USD 1.2 trillion worth of debt in order to stimulate 
lending and promote the country’s economic recovery; 
 April 2009: G20 leaders reach an agreement, with measures worth 
USD 1.1 trillion, to help global economic recovery. The IMF raises 
its global estimate of losses related to the 2007-2009 credit crisis to 
USD 4 trillion and warns that banks worldwide may need USD 1.7 
trillion in additional capital injections; 
 May 2009: The results of the stress tests performed on North 
American banks indicate that ten of the largest 19 banks need a total 
of approximately USD 75 billion in extra capital; 
 June 2009: General Motors files for Chapter 11. On a more positive 
tone, ten of the largest banks that received capital injections from 
the Government of the USA announce that they will be able to 
return the funds previously received. With the purpose of preventing 
future financial crises, the Government of the USA announces a 







 July 2009: General Motors gets restructured and emerges from 
bankruptcy protection. The Government of the USA will own 61% 
of the Company; 
 August 2009: Fannie Mae requests an additional USD 10.7 billion 
from the Treasury Department; 
 November 2009: CIT Group, Inc. files for Chapter 11 and Fannie 
Mae requests an additional USD 15 billion from the Treasury 
Department. 
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The 2007-2009 credit crisis had a severe and worldwide impact, both in terms of 
economic performance and financial system regulation. The banking system underwent 
a profound change – in the USA several banks went bankrupt or, otherwise, were 
acquired in order to avoid their collapse, the Government took control of several 
financial institutions and the investment banking industry ceased to operate and/or exist 
as it was long been known. Financial and economic conditions deteriorated mainly after 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, which had a tremendous effect in economic agents’ 
confidence. Governments worldwide announced large intervention plans in order to 
mitigate the effects of the financial and economic crisis, which consequently led to an 
escalation of their public deficits and of their public debt stocks. 
Figure 9 depicts the evolution of financial institution failures in the USA between 
January 2008 and November 2009, considering commercial banks, thrifts and credit 
unions. The third quarter of 2008 is clearly influenced by the failure of the Washington 
Mutual Bank, which had total assets of approximately USD 353,070 million
15
. 
According to data obtained from iBanknet, between January 2008 and November 2009 
it was registered a total of 178 financial institution failures, with corresponding total 
assets of USD 563,109 million. Figure 9 shows that financial institution failures 
increased substantially from the third quarter of 2008 onwards. 
 
Figure 9. Evolution of financial institution failures in the USA between January 2008 
and November 2009. 
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 This figure includes both Washington Mutual Bank (with total assets of USD 307,022 million) and 
Washington Mutual Bank FSB (with total assets of USD 46,048 million). 
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3. Literature Review 
 
The determinants of credit losses used in its empirical modeling can be generally 
classified into two major classes – external and bank-specific factors. External factors 
are mainly related to economic indicators, such as GDP growth and changes in the 
unemployment rate, while bank-specific factors used to model credit losses include net 
interest margin, cost-to-income ratio and loan portfolio growth. Researchers tend to use 
both external and bank-specific factors as determinants of credit losses, based on the 
assumption that each bank’s performance is dependent of intrinsic factors, but also of 
potential systematic issues arising from macroeconomic conditions. 
 
3.1. External Determinants of Credit Losses 
 
Hess, Grimes and Holmes (2008a) used GDP growth and both the level and 
change of unemployment rate as external macroeconomic factors to model credit losses 
of Australasian banks for the period between 1980 and 2005. While all factors did have 
the expected effects on banks’ credit losses with a lag of one year (i.e., banks’ credit 
losses increased with lower GDP growth, with higher levels of unemployment rates and 
positive changes in unemployment rates), they have concluded that the unemployment 
rate level was the most relevant external determinant of Australasian banks’ credit 
losses. GDP growth and change of unemployment rate were highly negatively 
correlated and as a consequence those variables weren’t included jointly in the same 
regression. The authors also used as external determinants of Australasian banks’ credit 
losses the return on the national share index, changes in the housing price index and 
changes in the consumer price index
16
. The first two variables were found to have a 
negative impact on banks’ credit losses, i.e., higher returns on the national share index 
and increases in the housing price index were associated with lower credit losses. 
Additionally, the return on the national share index had a greater explanatory power of 
Australasian banks’ credit losses than changes in the housing price index. Although 
with limited significance, changes in the consumer price index were found to have a 
positive association with credit losses, having estimation results also shown that the 
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 The return on the national share index and changes in the housing price index were used as proxies for 
asset price shocks. 
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effects of this external factor tended to increase in time (i.e., contemporaneous changes 
had a reduced impact on credit losses, but it tended to increase with longer lags). 
GDP growth and change of the unemployment rate were also used by Głogowski 
(2008) as external determinants of Polish banks’ credit losses for the period between 
1997 and 2006, having been concluded that those factors had the expected effects on 
credit losses. Additionally, the author analyzed if Polish banks’ credit losses could also 
be influenced by adverse changes in the exchange rate, due to associated higher costs of 
loan repayments to households
17
. It was concluded that changes in the exchange rate 
didn’t influence credit losses, even when it is taken into consideration each bank’s share 
of foreign exchange loans. Głogowski (2008) also used as external determinants real 
interest rates and the employment level, having found evidence that an increase of the 
former and a decrease of the latter were associated with higher credit losses. 
Quagliariello (2004) used static and dynamic panel models in order to study 
Italian banks for the period between 1985 and 2002, in terms of loan loss provisions and 
flow of new nonperforming loans. The author found that Italian banks tend to reflect 
smaller credit losses during phases of economic expansion, but still GDP growth is only 
significant if lagged by one and two years (being the latter’s coefficient larger), thus 
suggesting that economic cyclical impacts tend to be delayed. A negative association 
between credit losses and unemployment rate changes was found by the author, 
suggesting that an increase of the unemployment rate would result in lower credit losses. 
This finding was unexpected and according to the author a possible explanation for such 
could be a potential overlapping between unemployment rate changes and GDP growth 
in what concerns to the capture of the business cycles’ effects on credit losses. 
Quagliariello (2004) also used as external determinants of credit losses interest 
rates on long term Treasury bonds, stock market’s level of appreciation or depreciation 
and the spread between loans and deposits’ interest rates for the Italian banking system. 
It was found a negative association between credit losses and long term interest rates of 
Treasury bonds, thus suggesting that this variable is likely to be a proxy for the business 
cycle, since interest rates are normally higher in phases of economic expansion, when 
credit losses are typically lower
18
. The stock market’s level of appreciation or 
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 Polish banks have a significant share of foreign exchange loans to households, so the author analyzed 
the potential impact related to that fact. 
18
 Higher interest rates can also implicate increased difficulties for borrowers to meet their obligations, 
and as a consequence, higher credit losses, for which reason the author initially considered the expected 
sign of this variable to be ambiguous. 
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depreciation was used as a proxy for financial markets’ conditions. The author found a 
“boom and bust pattern”, which means that a continued upward market phase precedes a 
steep decline of asset prices. Accordingly, the author found different signs for the 
lagged and the contemporaneous coefficients (the former assumed a negative sign while 
the latter had a positive one). Lagged interest rate spreads between loans and deposits 
had a positive association with credit losses, implying that larger spreads between loans 
and deposits are symptomatic of increased default risk (and thus of higher credit losses) 
and/or anticipate economic cyclical downturns. It is worth mentioning that, as stated 
before, this variable was calculated for the Italian banking system and therefore the used 
methodology doesn’t consider each bank’s specific conditions. Quagliariello (2004) 
used exactly the same determinants to study the flow of new nonperforming loans, 
having found evidence of significant positive associations between the dependent 
variable and interest rates on long term Treasury bonds and unemployment rate changes. 
Estimation results also demonstrated that the flow of new nonperforming loans had 
significant negative associations with GDP growth and interest rate spreads between 
loans and deposits. 
The determinants of credit losses were also studied by Pain (2003), for a sample 
of UK’s commercial and mortgage banks for the period between 1978 and 2000. It was 
found evidence of a negative association between GDP growth (both domestic and 
world GDP growth for commercial banks and domestic GDP growth only for mortgage 
banks) and credit losses, while the unemployment rate was found to be not significant. 
Real interest rates were found to have a positive association with credit losses, thus in 
accordance with Głogowski’s (2008) conclusions. Influence on credit losses of capital 
and income gearing in the household and corporate sectors were also studied, having 
these factors found to be not significant
19
. The author also tested the statistical 
significance of asset price levels (foreign exchange rates, equity prices and real estate 
prices), having those variables also proved to be not significant. 
In order to model nonperforming loans of Spanish banks for the period between 
1984 and 2002, Jiménez and Saurina (2006) used as external determinants of 
nonperforming loans
20
 GDP growth and real interest rates. The authors found a negative 
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 The author obtained evidence that if capital and income gearing in the household and corporate sectors 
were to be significant, then GDP growth and real interest rates would become not statistically significant. 
20
 Although this study is focused on the determinants of credit losses, there’s a strong relation between the 
increase of nonperforming loans and the increase of credit losses, for which reason it were also reviewed 
studies related to determinants of nonperforming loans. 
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influence of GDP growth and a positive effect of real interest rates (i.e., the stock of 
nonperforming loans increases with lower GDP growth and higher real interest rates). 
Salas and Saurina (2002) used panel data to analyze the determinants of 
nonperforming loans of Spanish commercial and savings banks for the period between 
1985 and 1997. The authors found a significant negative association between GDP 
growth rate (both contemporaneous and one-year lagged coefficients) and 
nonperforming loans. It was also used as external determinants of the dependent 
variable the families’ indebtedness ratio (as measured by families’ total liabilities over 
GDP) and firms’ debt-to-equity ratio (as measured by firms’ total liabilities over their 
respective market values). Both variables were found to be significant only for savings 
banks and their impact on nonperforming loans was dissimilar – the families’ 
indebtedness ratio had a negative influence on nonperforming loans, while the firms’ 
debt-to-equity ratio had a positive effect on the dependent variable. The authors 
expected both variables’ coefficients to be positive and therefore the negative sign for 
the families’ indebtedness ratio was somewhat difficult to interpret. The authors 
suggested that it could be due to the fact that families’ debt is normalized by GDP and 
as a consequence it could be capturing the effects of the economic cycle. Finally, it was 
introduced a dummy variable with the purpose of analyzing the impact of regulatory 
changes introduced in 1988
21
. As expected by the authors, it was found evidence of a 
positive association between this variable and nonperforming loans (which was tested 
for savings banks only). 
Credit loss experience was also studied by Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991), 
considering a sample of 154 North American commercial banks for the period between 
1984 and 1987. Two model specifications were considered by the authors – a model 
with a broad definition of credit losses (which considered as credit losses the sum of net 
charge-offs and nonperforming loans) and a model with a narrower definition of credit 
losses (which considered as credit losses net charge-offs only). 
Only one external determinant of credit losses was used by Sinkey and 
Greenawalt (1991) – each bank’s location, in order to account for economic differences 
across regions. The analysis was performed using dummy variables, having the authors 
concluded for the existence of significant credit loss differences for banks of two 
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 Spanish central bank’s regulation 22/1987 introduced a more rigorous definition of nonperforming 
loans, which had particular impact on savings banks, since collateralized overdue loans (including loans 
collateralized by mortgages) also became eligible as a nonperforming loan. Traditionally, mortgage loans 
were the most relevant business segment for Spanish savings banks. 
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regions of the USA in comparison to money-center banks for the model with a broad 
definition of credit losses (Southwest banks had higher credit losses in comparison to 
money-center banks, while Midwest banks’ credit losses were lower). For the model 
with a narrower definition of credit losses, estimation results revealed significant credit 
loss differences between money-center banks and Southwest banks only. 
 
3.2. Bank-Specific Determinants of Credit Losses 
 
As bank-specific determinants of credit losses, Hess, Grimes and Holmes (2008a) 
considered each bank’s share of total private sector loans, pricing of risks as measured 
by net interest margins, bank assets’ growth rate, cost-to-income ratio and earnings 
before taxes and provisions (the latter variable was used as a proxy to study banks’ 
potential income smoothing practices). It was found a positive association between 
banks’ sizes (as measured by each bank’s share of total private sector loans) and credit 
losses, thus indicating higher credit losses for larger banks. Nevertheless, the coefficient 
of this variable was generally significant only for the full sample of Australasian banks, 
i.e., for the country sub-samples this variable tended to be not significant. 
Higher net interest margins were found to have a negative association with credit 
losses for the current and the two-year lagged terms, although generally not a significant 
one, since the two-year lagged term was the only one to be statistically significant, and 
only for the full sample of Australasian Banks (i.e., for the country sub-samples it 
proved to be not significant, thus demonstrating that net interest margins seemed to 
have little explanatory power). Bank assets’ growth rates tended to be statistically 
significant only for lagged terms (generally, for lags of two or more years), having the 
authors found a positive association between lagged terms of this variable and credit 
losses (current terms’ coefficients of bank assets’ growth rates were negative, though 
not significant). Cost-to-income ratio was used as a cost efficiency proxy. It was found 
a significant positive association between credit losses and banks’ current cost-to-
income ratios and negative coefficients for cost-to-income ratios’ lagged terms 
(although the latter were generally not significant). Therefore the authors concluded that 
high and increasing cost-to-income ratios were associated with higher credit losses
22
. 
                                                          
22
 This conclusion is in accordance to one of the findings of Berger and DeYoung (1997), who used 
Granger-causality techniques and found that an increase in cost efficiency precedes a reduction in the 
stock of nonperforming loans. 
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Concerning earnings before taxes and provisions, Hess, Grimes and Holmes 
(2008a) found evidence of an income smoothing pattern, given the positive association 
between the current terms of this variable and credit losses. Additionally, the lagged 
terms’ coefficients of earnings before taxes and provisions tended to be negative and 
frequently significant, which may indicate that credit losses may be recognized later in 
case of low earnings in a particular year
23
. 
In his study, Głogowski (2008) has used as bank-specific determinants of credit 
losses in his model final specifications each bank’s capital adequacy ratio’s deviation 
from sector median, the share of housing loans in loans to households, the share of loans 
to households in total loans to the nonfinancial sector, loan growth rate’s deviation from 
sector mean and dummy variables to account for each bank’s business profile, 
seasonality and regulatory changes adopted in 2004 and 2005
24
. It was found that higher 
credit losses were associated to banks with lower capital levels (although its influence 
proved to be significant only for short time lags). This variable was used in order to test 
the moral hazard hypothesis, i.e., the possibility that banks with lower capital ratios may 
lend to lower creditworthiness borrowers with the purpose of increasing returns in the 
short term, although usually at the expense of their loan portfolios’ credit risk profile. 
Głogowski (2008) also concluded that banks with higher shares of loans to 
households were the ones to present higher credit losses, which was unexpected, 
especially because studies performed in developed countries tend to demonstrate that 
loans to households are, in general, less risky than corporate loans. His finding can 
nevertheless be explained by the share of housing loans in loans to households, which is 
significantly higher, for instance, in euro area countries in comparison to Poland. The 
author also found evidence of a negative association between the share of housing loans 
in loans to households and credit losses, which indicates that housing loans are 
relatively less risky assets. Banks with higher loan growth rates (compared to the sector 
mean) were found to have higher credit losses, while the banks’ business profile proved 
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 Evidence of provisions for credit losses being used to stabilize banks’ net income was also found by 
other authors, including Arpa, Giulini, Ittner and Pauer (2001), Bikker and Hu (2002), Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2003), Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Hasan and Wall (2003) and Quagliariello (2004). In 
contrast, Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) didn’t find a statistically significant evidence of provisions 
for credit losses being used as an income smoothing technique. 
24
 In 2004, there was a change in the regulatory loan classification rules in Poland (which resulted in 
“softer” rules and, subsequently, allowed for a decrease of banks’ ratios of adversely classified loans), 
while in 2005 some of the Polish banks adopted for the first time the International Financial Reporting 
Standards for the preparation of their financial statements. 
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to have minor impact on credit losses
25
. Finally, the effects of regulatory changes were 
considered to be uncertain, given that the statistical significance of the respective 
dummy variables tended to vary between model specifications. 
Quagliariello (2004) used as bank-specific determinants of credit losses each 
bank’s performing loans’ growth rate, the return on assets, the stock of nonperforming 
loans and the flow of new nonperforming loans. It was found a negative association 
between credit losses and performing loans’ growth rate, thus diverging from 
conclusions of Głogowski (2008) on this matter. Quagliariello (2004) suggests that 
higher loan growth rates should not be immediately understood as a sign of upcoming 
higher credit losses, since credit growth may result from both demand and supply 
factors. Thus, Quagliariello (2004) concludes, it is not straightforward that banks 
registering higher loan growth rates are necessarily accepting lower creditworthiness 
borrowers. The author re-estimated his model using the difference between each bank’s 
loan growth rate and the average loan growth rate for the Italian banking system, and 
the resulting coefficient still remained negative. Comparing to other researchers’ results, 
a possible explanation for the author’s conclusions may be the fact that he used only a 
one-year lagged loan growth rate coefficient, which eventually did not allow for 
sufficient “time” for nonperforming loans to emerge. 
A positive association between credit losses and return on assets was found by 
Quagliariello (2004), suggesting that banks tend to use income smoothing techniques. 
Concerning the stock of nonperforming loans and the flow of new nonperforming loans, 
the author found evidence of a positive association between both variables and credit 
losses, thus suggesting (as expected) that banks’ credit losses tend to reflect their 
portfolios’ risk profile. Concerning the flow of new nonperforming loans, only two 
bank-specific determinants turned out to be statistically significant: each bank’s one-
year lagged performing loans’ growth rate (negative association with the dependent 
variable) and cost-to-income ratio (positive association with the dependent variable for 
the contemporaneous coefficient and negative association with the dependent variable 
for the one-year lagged coefficient
26
). The author also used as proxies for each bank’s 
                                                          
25
 The author found that credit losses were on average lower for specialized banks. In contrast, universal 
banks had a relatively higher sensitivity to unemployment rate changes, while corporate banks tended to 
have a comparatively higher sensitivity to GDP growth. 
26
 Hess, Grimes and Holmes (2008a) arrived to similar conclusions in what concerns the signs of both 
contemporaneous and lagged cost-to-income coefficients (although lagged cost-to-income coefficients 
were not significant in their study). Quagliariello (2004) considered cost-to-income ratio to behave in a 
strange manner, but nevertheless he did not present a possible explanation for it. 
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risk taking behavior interest income measured as a percentage of total assets and the 
ratio of equity capital to total assets, having both variables proved to be not significant. 
In order to study credit losses of UK’s commercial and mortgage banks for the 
period between 1978 and 2000, Pain (2003) used as bank-specific variables each bank’s 
overall credit growth, net interest margins, the share of loans to sectors characterized by 
riskier credit profiles, the loan portfolio’s concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl 
index), the ratio of secured lending to households as a percentage of total loans, cost-to-
income ratio, the number of employees per branch and the share of total assets as a 
percentage of UK’s banking sector total assets. In what concerns each bank’s overall 
credit growth, once more it wasn’t found evidence that a rapid loan growth could imply 
higher credit losses, given that in some model specifications the lagged coefficient of 
this variable was found to be significantly negative (but still quite small). The author 
decided not to continue with overall credit growth as a determinant of credit losses in 
his study since the negative coefficient could be a result of credit demand’s fall when 
overall economic conditions are worsening. That variable was replaced with lagged M4 
lending. The author found aggregate lending growth rate to be statistically significant, 
thus suggesting that banks experiencing loan portfolio growth are prone to higher credit 
losses if other banks’ loan portfolios are also increasing. 
Net interest margins were found to be statistically significant only for mortgage 
banks, having estimation results revealed a positive association with credit losses. The 
ratio of secured lending to households (loans secured against residential real estate) as a 
percentage of total loans was also found to be significant only for mortgage banks, 
having estimation results revealed a negative association between this variable and 
credit losses, thus suggesting that collateral can mitigate credit losses for mortgage 
banks. The share of loans to riskier credit profile sectors
27
 was statistically significant 
for commercial banks only, having shown the expected sign (i.e., positive association 
with credit losses). The author has also found evidence that commercial banks with less 
diversified loan portfolios were associated to higher credit losses, thus proving the 
benefits of portfolio diversification. Cost-to-income ratio proved to be clearly 
significant for mortgage banks (having estimation results revealed a negative 
association between this variable and credit losses), whilst for commercial banks it had 
                                                          
27
 The author found evidence that only loans to commercial real estate companies had a significant 
influence in banks’ credit losses. Loans to other sectors, such as manufacturing, agricultural and personal 
unsecured borrowing, did not significantly affect banks’ credit losses. 
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little effect on credit losses. Finally, the number of employees per branch and the share 
of each bank’s total assets as a percentage of UK’s banking sector total assets were both 
found to be not significant. 
Particular attention was given to loan portfolio growth rate by Jiménez and 
Saurina (2006), concerning bank-specific determinants of Spanish banks’ 
nonperforming loans for the period between 1984 and 2002. The authors found 
evidence that loan portfolio growth rates lagged four years have a significant positive 
effect on nonperforming loans, while loan portfolio growth rates lagged two or three 
years proved to be not statistically significant
28
. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) also used 
each bank’s loan portfolio concentration by region and industry (as measured by the 
Herfindahl index) as bank-specific determinants of nonperforming loans. They found 
evidence that higher region concentration was associated to higher levels of 
nonperforming loans, while industry concentration was not statistically significant. 
Additionally, and similar to conclusions of Pain (2003) for UK’s mortgage banks, the 
authors found that collateralized loans to households had a negative effect on 
nonperforming loans (i.e., higher shares of fully collateralized loans to households as a 
percentage of total loans were associated to banks with lower ratios of nonperforming 
loans). The authors also analyzed the potential relevance of each bank’s market share on 
nonperforming loans, which revealed to be not significant. 
On another study performed on Spanish banks’ determinants of nonperforming 
loans, Salas and Saurina (2002) used as bank-specific variables the loan portfolio 
growth rate, the branch network growth rate, cost-to-income ratio, the share of loans 
without collateral to total loans of the private sector, the share of assets over total assets 
of the Spanish banking system (i.e., including commercial and savings banks), the net 
interest margin, the ratio of capital to total assets, the market share (based on the 
proportion of branches in each Spanish province, which was used as a proxy for each 
bank’s market power) and risk premium (measured as the difference between each 
bank’s interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate). Loan portfolio 
growth rate had a significant positive effect only for savings banks (and only for the 
three-year lagged coefficient), while the branch network growth rate proved to have a 
                                                          
28
 Clair (1992), Foos, Norden and Weber (2009) and Keeton (1999) also found evidence that prior higher 
loan portfolio growth rates result in increased contemporaneous credit losses. Nevertheless, the 
conclusions concerning the effect of loan portfolio growth rates on credit losses are rather mixed, taking 
into consideration, for instance, findings provided by the studies performed by Pain (2003) and 
Quagliariello (2004), which were referred to earlier. 
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significant positive impact for both commercial and savings banks (although for distinct 
lagged coefficients). Cost-to-income ratio and the share of loans without collateral to 
total loans of the private sector were significant only for savings banks (both variables 
having a positive impact on nonperforming loans). The share of assets over total assets 
of the Spanish banking system and the ratio of capital to total assets were statistically 
significant only for commercial banks (both variables having a negative impact on 
nonperforming loans). The ratio of capital to total assets was used as a proxy for banks’ 
risk-taking behavior – banks with lower capital ratios may be tempted to adopt a policy 
of rapid credit expansion in sectors of relatively higher profitability (and, as a 
consequence, higher risk sectors). 
Net interest margin and market share were significant for savings banks only (the 
former variable having a negative impact on nonperforming loans and the latter one 
having a positive effect on the dependent variable). The authors expected a negative 
coefficient for net interest margin based on the assumption that its decrease could result 
in a riskier credit policy and consequently in a loan portfolio with an upcoming higher 
default probability. Concerning market share, its positive coefficient reveals that when 
market share increases banks lend to borrowers with lower credit quality. Risk premium 
was found to be not significant, either for commercial or savings banks. It is worth 
mentioning that coefficient signs for all statistically significant associations between the 
dependent variable and its determinants were as expected by the authors. 
On their analysis of credit loss experience of North American commercial banks 
for the period between 1984 and 1987, Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) used as bank-
specific determinants of credit losses each bank’s loan portfolio yield, the ratio of loans 
to assets, the ratio of volatile funds
29
 to total liabilities and the ratio of equity to assets. 
For the model specification considering a broad definition of credit losses, the first three 
variables were found to have a significant positive association with credit losses, whilst 
the ratio of equity to assets was not significant. For the model specification considering 
a narrower definition of credit losses, estimation results revealed a significant positive 
association between the ratio of loans to assets and credit losses and a significant 
negative association between the ratio of equity to assets and credit losses. 
 
                                                          
29
 The definition of “volatile funds” used by the authors corresponds to the sum of federal funds 
purchased, large certificates of deposit, foreign deposits and other borrowed money. 
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4. The Methodology and Data 
 
This study was based on a sample of 349 BHCs which were as of December 31
st
 
2006 classified in peers 1, 2 or 3, in accordance with thresholds defined by the FED
30
. 
The total number of BHCs classified in one of the abovementioned peers as of 
December 31
st
 2006 was in fact higher in comparison to the total number of BHCs used 
in the sample due to various reasons (as of that same date there was a total of 421 BHCs 
classified in peers 1, 2 or 3). Firstly, there were financial institutions that changed their 
status from BHC to “Domestic Entity Other” and, as a result, those entities ceased to be 
subject to the FED’s regulation. Secondly, financial institutions that were acquired 
between December 2006 and December 2008 by other non-BHC entities or by BHCs 
classified in peer 9 weren’t also considered, as well as BHCs that are headquartered in 
Puerto Rico. Finally, financial institutions with less than 3 years of available financial 
data, as of December 2006, weren’t also included in this study, since some of the credit 
loss determinants are dependent on such data availability. 
Concerning financial institutions that were acquired by other BHCs classified in 
peers 1, 2 or 3, historical financial data was obtained by summing the amounts of the 
several captions used to build the bank-specific credit loss determinants. It is worth to 
mention that acquisitions of BHCs between December 2003 and December 2006 by 
other BHCs classified in peers 1, 2 or 3 were also considered and the same procedure 
was applied in order to obtain historical financial data. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the determinants of North American BHCs’ 
credit losses reported in 2008, which to the author’s knowledge was not carried out 
before by other researchers. As determinants of BHCs’ credit losses, external and bank-
specific factors were considered. 
Since the used sample includes quite different BHCs in terms of geographic 
presence, external determinants of credit losses were based on information at national, 
regional and state levels, obtained from recognized North American public entities. To 
the author’s knowledge, as there isn’t available public information concerning BHCs’ 
loan portfolio geographic distribution, it was necessary to set assumptions in order to 
define whether a given BHC develops its activities at a national, regional or state level 
and subsequently to allow for the use of external determinants of credit losses. Those 
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 See Appendix 1 for a list of the BHCs comprising the sample considered in this study. 
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assumptions were essentially based on the analysis of existing gaps between BHCs’ 
loan portfolio sizes as of December 2008. Thus, on one hand, BHCs that were not 
classified in peer 1 were considered to develop their activities at a state-level solely. On 
the other hand, for BHCs classified in peer 1, the four largest BHCs
31
 were considered 
to act on a national level, while the remaining BHCs classified in peer 1 were split into 
two groups – in the first group it were included BHCs with loan portfolios greater than 
USD 25 billion, which were considered to develop their activities at a regional level
32
, 
whilst the second one grouped BHCs with loan portfolios below USD 25 billion, which 
were considered to act at a state level. It is acknowledged that used assumptions have 
obvious limitations, since it wasn’t considered each BHC’s actual loan portfolio 
geographic distribution. In addition, it is worth noting that larger BHCs also develop 
credit activities outside the USA, whereby to a certain extent their credit losses are also 
affected by other countries’ economic conditions. 
Bank-specific determinants of credit losses were based on BHCs’ financial data 
obtained from the FED, particularly on regulatory fillings BHCs have to submit 
periodically to the regulator and that are publicly available through the NIC. Since 
BHCs’ financial data was obtained from a single information source data, comparability 
issues across BHCs are mitigated. Quantitative data on BHCs available through the NIC 
is quite extensive, including financial statements, details of several captions of the 
financial statements and also regulatory capital ratios’ calculation. 
BHCs’ credit losses reported in 2008 (the dependent variable used in this study), 
correspond to the charges reflected in BHCs’ income statements in 2008 (in caption 
“provision for loan and lease losses”), measured as a percentage of the yearly average 
loan portfolio. Determinants of credit losses (i.e., independent variables) try to cover 
various aspects that may have influenced BHCs’ credit loss experience in 2008. On one 
hand, external determinants were used in order to account for distinct macroeconomic 
conditions and impacts of the housing market crisis across regions and/or states of the 
USA. On the other hand, bank-specific determinants were used with the purpose of 
accounting for (i) each BHC’s loan portfolio risk profile (including average spreads, 
                                                          
31
 Bank of America Corporation, Wells Fargo & Company, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc.. 
There is a considerable gap between the total amount of the loan portfolios of these four BHCs and the 
total amount of the loan portfolio of the fifth-largest BHC. Citigroup Inc., the fourth-largest BHC in terms 
of loan portfolio size as of December 2008, held USD 694,080 million in net loans and leases, while U.S. 
Bancorp, the fifth-largest BHC, held USD 184,651 million in net loans and leases at that same date. 
32
 Considered regions are in accordance with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Divisions: New England, Middle 
Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, 
Mountain and Pacific. 
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proportions of loans with riskier credit profiles and the share of restructured loans), (ii) 
credit growth aggressiveness, (iii) risk-taking behavior, (iv) the existence of significant 
off-balance sheet credit risk in the form of retained credit exposure in securitization 
activities, (v) the development of foreign credit activities, (vi) loan loss provisioning 
policies and (vii) the identification of BHCs’ auditing firms. As far as the author is 
aware, some of the variables considered in this study have never been used before by 
other researchers, namely the proportion of restructured loans, retained credit exposure 
in securitization activities and the identification of BHCs’ auditing firms. Table 3 lists 
all variables used in this study as determinants of BHCs’ credit losses in 2008. 
 
Table 3. Variables used as determinants of BHCs’ credit losses in 2008. 
 
Variable Acronym Description / Observations Expected Sign
External Determinants of Credit Losses:
GDP growth rate GDPGR08 GDP growth rate in 2008 (source: BEA). -ve
Change of HPI Purchase-
Only Index
HPIPOV08 Change of HPI Purchase-Only Index in 2008 
expressed in percentage points (source: FHFA).
-ve
Bank-Specific Determinants of Credit Losses:
Loan portfolio average 
spread
SAIRLL04-07 Loan portfolio average spread (over the 6 month 
LIBOR) for the period between December 2003 and 
December 2007
+ve
Loan portfolio growth rate LPGR05-07 Loan portfolio CAGR for the period between 
December 2004 and December 2007
+ve
Proportion of construction, 
land development and other 
land loans
PCLDOLL07 Proportion of construction, land development and 
other land loans (as a percentage of total loans) as of 
December 2007
+ve
Proportion of consumer loans PCL07 Proportion of consumer loans (as a percentage of 
total loans) as of December 2007
+ve
Proportion of restructured 
loans
PRLL07 Proportion of restructured loans (as a percentage of 
total loans) as of December 2007
+ve
Tier 1 capital ratio AT1CR04-07 Average Tier 1 capital ratio for the period between 
December 2003 and December 2007
-ve
Retained credit exposure in 
securitization activities
PRCES08 Average retained credit exposure in securitization 
activities during 2008 (as a percentage of the yearly 
average loan portfolio)
+ve
Proportion of foreign loans PFL07 Proportion of foreign loans (as a percentage of total 
loans) as of December 2007
+ve/-ve
Past due and nonaccrual 
loans provisioning ratio
PDNALPR07 Allowance for loan losses as a percentage of past 
due and nonaccrual loans as of December 2007
-ve
Auditing firm AF08 BHC's auditing firm in 2008 (dummy variable: 1 in 





Both variables used as external determinants are expected to have a negative 
effect on BHCs’ credit losses. GDP growth rate is a commonly used determinant of 
credit losses (as clearly pointed out in the literature review) and it should be expected 
that BHCs operating in more challenging economic conditions would have 
39 
 
comparatively higher credit losses. Change of HPI Purchase-Only Index in 2008 is also 
expected to have a negative impact in BHCs’ credit losses, especially on those with 
higher exposures to residential real estate, since in case of default BHCs will likely 
recover a lower amount (given the collateral’s depreciation). 
Concerning bank-specific determinants of credit losses, there are several variables 
used to characterize BHCs’ loan portfolio risk profile, all of which are expected to have 
a positive association with credit losses. The loan portfolio average spread is one of 
those variables – BHCs with higher spreads on their loan portfolios may lend to riskier 
borrowers and thus those BHCs are subject to comparatively higher credit losses. 
BHCs with higher proportions of loans with riskier credit profiles are also 
expected to have higher credit losses. This study considers the proportion of 
construction, land development and other land loans as well as the proportion of 
consumer loans as loan types with riskier credit profiles. Given that the real estate sector 
was particularly hit in the context of the 2007-2009 credit crisis, this study considered 
as a bank-specific determinant of credit losses the proportion of construction, land 
development and other land loans held by BHCs since these loans are typically riskier 
in comparison to loans granted to companies operating in other business sectors. This 
variable is thus used to account for the impact on BHCs’ credit losses of their exposure 
to commercial real estate, whilst the impact of their exposure to residential real estate is 
captured by one of the external determinants (change of HPI Purchase-Only Index). As 
mentioned in the literature review, Pain (2003) also found evidence that loans to 
commercial real estate companies had a significant influence on UK’s commercial 
banks’ credit losses. The share of consumer loans was also used as a bank-specific 
determinant of credit losses given that it generally constitutes the riskier loan type to 
individual borrowers. 
The proportion of restructured loans was also used as a proxy for BHCs’ loan 
portfolio risk profile, since loans may be restructured in order to relieve financial 
pressure on borrowers that were facing loan repayment difficulties. Thus, it should be 
expected a positive association between the share of restructured loans and reported 
credit losses. 
Loan portfolio growth rate for the period 2005-2007 was also used as a bank-
specific determinant of credit losses. It is expected that BHCs that expanded their credit 
activities at a faster pace should experiment higher credit losses, since faster growth 
rates may be associated with a deterioration of the loan portfolio risk profile. 
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In this study it was also used as a bank-specific determinant of credit losses BHCs’ 
average Tier 1 capital ratio for the period 2004-2007. It is expected a negative 
association between this variable and reported credit losses, since BHCs with lower 
capital ratios may be tempted to adopt riskier credit policies with the purpose of 
increasing their returns in the short term, which would be in accordance with results of 
Głogowski (2008) and Salas and Saurina (2002). 
Besides credit risk exposure from balance sheet items (i.e., the loan portfolio), 
BHCs may also have credit risk exposure related to off-balance sheet items, which 
include securitization activities, especially through credit enhancements BHCs grant to 
investors that acquired securities related to those financial instruments. Since credit 
losses may also arise from such activities, it was considered as a bank-specific 
determinant of credit losses the ratio of retained credit exposure in securitization 
activities during 2008 expressed as a percentage of the yearly average loan portfolio. It 
is expected a positive association between this variable and reported credit losses, since 
more extensive credit enhancements imply that BHCs will potentially bear a 
comparatively higher proportion of losses arising from securitization activities. 
The proportion of foreign loans as a percentage of total loans was also used as a 
bank-specific determinant of credit losses. Its expected sign is uncertain, since 
geographical diversification may improve the loan portfolio risk profile (and thus higher 
shares of foreign loans would have a negative association with credit losses), but at the 
same time foreign borrowers’ creditworthiness may be lower in comparison to domestic 
borrowers’ creditworthiness (and as a result higher shares of foreign loans would have a 
positive association with credit losses). 
Since this study is focused on the determinants of credit losses in a specific year, 
the provisioning level recorded in the end of the immediately previous year by each 
BHC may also prove to be a relevant variable. As a result it was used as a bank-specific 
determinant of credit losses the past due and nonaccrual loans provisioning ratio, which 
corresponds to the value of allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total past due 
and nonaccrual loans as of December 2007. It is expected a negative association 
between this variable and reported credit losses, based on the assumption that BHCs 
with lower delinquent loans’ provisioning ratios in the end of 2007 may need to 
increase their provisions for loan losses at a faster pace than BHCs with higher 
provisioning ratios as of that same date. 
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Finally, with the purpose of finding if credit losses reported by BHCs in 2008 may 
have been influenced by the companies that provided auditing services, it was used a 
dummy variable as a bank-specific determinant of credit losses. This dummy variable 
separates the “Big Four” auditing firms from the remaining ones (the “Big Four” 
auditing firms refers to Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
In 2008, from a total of 349 BHCs that comprised this study’s sample, 147 BHCs 
(approximately 42%) were audited by one of the “Big Four” auditing firms. It can be 
argued that the “Big Four” auditing firms may have a comparatively higher influence 
over their clients in aspects or areas characterized by a higher degree of subjectivity. 
Loan loss provisioning is clearly one of those areas and as a result BHCs that were 
audited by one of the “Big Four” auditing firms may have reported comparatively 
higher credit losses. Thus, it is expected a positive association between this variable and 
BHCs’ reported credit losses in 2008. 
The estimated model for credit losses reported by North American BHCs in 2008 
(PLLLi08) is as follows: 
 
PLLLi08 = Const + α1GDPGRi08 + α2HPIPOVi08 + β1SAIRLLi04-07 + β2LPGRi05-07 
+ β
3
PCLDOLLi07 + β4PCLi07 + β5PRLLi07 + β6AT1CRi04-07 + β7PRCESi08  
+ β
8
PFLi07 + β9PDNALPRi07 + β10AFi08 + εi08  
 
where PLLLi08 is the provision for loan and lease losses for BHC i in 2008 expressed as 
a percentage of the yearly average loan portfolio. The determinants of credit losses on 
the right hand side of the equation are explained in Table 3 and εi08 is the error term. 
The most frequently used variable by other researchers that was not considered in 
this study was probably cost-to-income ratio. In fact, this variable was not deliberately 
used as a bank-specific determinant of credit losses since each bank’s operating income 
is generally comprised in a significant part by income attributable to credit unrelated 
activities (e.g., interest income from credit unrelated activities, trading revenue, 
investment banking fees, securities brokerage and insurance activities income). 
Figure 10 presents operating income breakdown (before interest expense) for the 
sample of BHCs considered in this study for the period between 2004 and 2008. It 
clearly shows that income attributable to credit unrelated activities has a considerable 
weight in BHCs’ operating income during the covered period, ranging between 29.2% 
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and 35.7%. For BHCs classified in peer 1 those figures were even higher, ranging from 
39.4% to 46.7%. This suggests that largest BHCs are comparatively more dependent on 
income generated from credit unrelated activities. Cost-to-income ratio was used as a 
bank-specific determinant of credit losses and/or flow of new nonperforming loans by 
several authors, including Hess, Grimes and Holmes (2008a), Pain (2003), Quagliariello 
(2004) and Salas and Saurina (2002). 
 
Figure 10. Operating income breakdown (before interest expense). 
Figures relate to the sample of 349 BHCs considered in this study and were calculated 
as simple averages in order to prevent largest BHCs from significantly influencing 
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Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and for bank-
specific determinants of credit losses, while Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for 
external determinants of credit losses at national, regional and state levels. Table 5 only 
considers unique (i.e., unrepeated) observations of GDPGR08 and HPIPOV08, for which 
reason, for instance, at national level there is only one observation. Descriptive statistics 
show that credit loss experience in 2008 was quite dissimilar among BHCs, having 
credit losses ranged from 0.0% to 13.3%. The performed analysis also demonstrates that 
BHCs’ internal characteristics (i.e., bank-specific determinants) diverge significantly 
and that macroeconomic conditions and housing market prices during 2008 were rather 




Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and for bank-specific 
determinants of BHCs’ credit losses in 2008. 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis # of Obs.
PLLL08 1.41% 0.89% 13.31% 0.00% 1.43% 2.979 15.683 349
SAIRLL04-07 3.06% 3.02% 6.28% -1.10% 0.79% 0.116 3.769 349
LPGR05-07 12.82% 10.96% 55.88% -8.38% 9.39% 1.634 4.498 349
PCLDOLL07 17.73% 15.06% 82.95% 0.00% 12.88% 1.359 2.898 349
PCL07 5.84% 3.28% 51.25% 0.02% 6.75% 2.217 7.468 349
PRLL07 0.09% 0.00% 4.91% 0.00% 0.45% 8.207 74.179 349
AT1CR04-07 11.25% 10.83% 33.64% -4.68% 2.91% 2.075 16.223 349
PRCES08 0.05% 0.00% 6.12% 0.00% 0.41% 11.539 155.002 349
PFL07 0.87% 0.00% 55.23% 0.00% 4.72% 8.330 78.367 349
PDNALPR07 91.92% 66.28% 1019.12% 2.68% 100.48% 4.912 32.126 349
AF08 0.4212 - 1.0000 - 0.4945 0.321 (1.908) 349
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for external determinants of BHCs’ credit losses in 2008 
at national, regional and state levels. 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis # of Obs.
GDP growth rate (GDPGR08):
National level 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
Regional level 0.89% 1.00% 2.03% -0.38% 0.78% (0.204) (0.501) 9
State level 1.05% 1.20% 7.30% -1.60% 1.56% 1.235 4.781 44
Change of HPI Purchase-Only Index (HPIPOV08):
National level -8.24% -8.24% -8.24% -8.24% n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
Regional level -7.21% -5.52% -0.53% -22.21% 6.45% (1.794) 3.702 9





5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Model Estimation 
 
In order to model credit losses reported by North American BHCs in 2008 it was 
used a Two-Stage Least Squares estimator to ensure that heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are obtained
33
. Credit losses were modeled for the total sample (which 
comprised 349 BHCs) and also for two subsets, in order to analyze potential differences 
between BHCs based in their size. Accordingly, in the first subset it were included 
BHCs classified in peers 1 and 2 as of December 31
st
 2008 (total of 142 BHCs), while 
the second subset grouped BHCs classified in peers 3 and 4 as of that same date (total of 
207 BHCs). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and for bank-specific 
determinants of credit losses relating to the two considered subsets are presented in 
Appendix 2, while Appendix 3 presents the correlation coefficients between the 
dependent variable and the potential explanatory variables for the total sample as well 
as for the two subsets. 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimated model for the total sample and for the 
two considered subsets. Notwithstanding the fact that all coefficients present the 
expected signs
34
, there are some relevant differences between the two subsets that will 
be further analyzed and discussed. While for the total sample both external determinants 
of credit losses are statistically significant, for subset I (i.e., for larger BHCs) only GDP 
growth rate in 2008 is significant, whereas for subset II (i.e., for smaller BHCs) only the 
change of HPI Purchase-Only Index in 2008 is significant. Thus, in 2008 larger BHCs’ 
credit losses seemed to be influenced by the performance of the economy as a whole, 
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 It was found evidence of heteroskedasticity in OLS equation residuals and as a consequence simple 
OLS estimation procedures would not produce consistent parameter estimates. 
34
 PRLL07 for subset II is the only exception, but nevertheless its coefficient is clearly not significant. 
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Table 6. Model estimation results. 
“Subset I” relates to BHCs classified as of December 31
st
 2008 in peers 1 and 2, while 
“Subset II” groups BHCs classified as of December 31
st
 2008 in peers 3 and 4. T-
statistics (corrected for the presence of heteroskedasticity) are presented in brackets. 
 
Variables Total Sample Subset I Subset II
Const -0.0061 (-1.518) -0.0027 (-0.497) -0.0090** (-1.977)
External Determinants:
GDPGR08 -0.1940*** (-3.035) -0.4456*** (-3.479) -0.0604 (-1.012)
HPIPOV08 -0.0295*** (-3.057) -0.0049 (-0.314) -0.0468*** (-4.030)
Bank-Specific Determinants:
SAIRLL04-07 0.4599*** (3.890) 0.3317** (2.180) 0.5920*** (4.094)
LPGR05-07 0.0054 (0.717) 0.0035 (0.294) 0.0076 (0.696)
PCLDOLL07 0.0353*** (4.276) 0.0578*** (4.717) 0.0214** (2.389)
PCL07 0.0091 (1.277) 0.0186 (1.193) 0.0007 (0.088)
PRLL07 0.5991 (1.305) 0.9538*** (3.177) -0.0653 (-0.186)
AT1CR04-07 -0.0344** (-2.112) -0.0433 (-1.243) -0.0354 (-1.564)
PRCES08 0.1682*** (3.075) 0.1977 (0.969) 0.1817** (2.168)
PFL07 0.0406*** (4.818) 0.0442*** (5.360) -0.1396*** (-2.683)
PDNALPR07 -0.0019*** (-4.057) -0.0009* (-1.665) -0.0023*** (-3.379)
AF08 0.0070*** (5.460) 0.0078*** (3.786) 0.0049*** (3.221)




F-Statistic 26.969*** 16.907*** 16.094***
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Estimation results suggest that higher loan portfolio average spreads are 
associated to higher credit losses. The loan portfolio average spread proved to be 
significant for the total sample and for both considered subsets, although for subset I 
only at the 5% level. Smaller BHCs’ credit losses seemed to be more sensitive to this 
variable, being its impact in smaller BHCs clearly higher than in larger BHCs. Still on 
this matter, it was interesting to find that between 2004 and 2007 the loan portfolio 
average spread for subset II was systematically higher (in comparison to subset I), 
ranging from 25 basis points to 43 basis points
35
. 
Loan portfolio growth rate proved to be not statistically significant for all 
estimated models (i.e., total sample and both subsets), even though it was considered a 
relatively large time length (3 years)
36
. 
                                                          
35
 Source: Own calculation based on data gathered from the NIC. 
36
 Using a time length of 4 or 2 years would result in even less powerful t-statistics for the estimated 
coefficients of this variable. 
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In what refers to shares of loans with riskier credit profiles, only the proportion of 
construction, land development and other land loans proved to be significant (i.e., the 
share of consumer loans was not significant either for the total sample or for each of the 
subsets). The proportion of construction, land development and other land loans was 
simultaneously significant at the 1% level for the total sample and for larger BHCs, 
while for smaller BHCs it was significant at the 5% level. Therefore, estimation results 
demonstrate that commercial real estate loans tend to be riskier in comparison to other 
loan types. As pointed out in the literature review, Pain (2003) also found that the share 
of loans to commercial real estate companies had a positive association with UK’s 
commercial banks’ credit losses. 
The proportion of restructured loans proved to be significant only for larger BHCs 
(at the 1% level), while for smaller BHCs the estimated coefficient was not significantly 
different from zero. This discrepancy between larger and smaller BHCs was not 
expected. A possible explanation for this finding may be the fact that (at least some of 
the) larger BHCs may have used credit restructuring to hide or delay the development of 
nonperforming loans in a much more expressive fashion than smaller BHCs. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this study. 
The average Tier 1 capital ratio was statistically significant solely for the total 
sample, at the 5% level. As a result, there was limited statistical evidence that less 
capitalized BHCs may be tempted to adopt riskier credit policies. 
Retained credit exposure in securitization activities was found to be statistically 
significant for the total sample and for smaller BHCs (at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively). This finding was also unexpected and rather difficult to explain, as 
securitization activities are comparatively more relevant for larger BHCs, for which 
estimation results suggested that this variable didn’t influence their credit losses in 2008 
in a significant manner. Additionally, only four smaller BHCs had retained credit 
exposure in securitization activities during 2008 and those BHCs’ reported credit losses 
were even lower than average credit losses for subset II. Still on this matter, it is worth 
mentioning that the correlation between this bank-specific determinant and credit losses 
was found to be negative for smaller BHCs
37
. 
                                                          
37
 If those four BHCs happened to report credit losses in 2008 that were higher than average credit losses 
for comparable BHCs in terms of size (i.e., for Subset II) then this variable’s statistical significance for 
smaller BHCs would be relatively intuitive; nevertheless, it was not the case. See Appendix 3 for 
correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and potential explanatory variables (for the total 
sample as well as for both considered subsets). 
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The proportion of foreign loans was significant for the total sample and for both 
considered subsets at the 1% level. Nevertheless, estimation results suggest that this 
variable’s effect on BHCs’ credit losses was clearly different between larger BHCs and 
smaller BHCs. The coefficient’s sign was positive (higher proportions of foreign loans 
were associated to higher credit losses) for larger BHCs (and also for the total sample), 
thus suggesting that larger BHCs’ foreign borrowers’ credit profiles adversely affected 
credit losses in 2008. For smaller BHCs this variable’s coefficient sign was negative, 
thus indicating that, for smaller BHCs, the proportion of foreign loans has actually 
managed to behave as an effective tool for portfolio diversification. This conclusion is 
corroborated by the correlation coefficients previously calculated for both subsets 
separately – while for larger BHCs it was found a positive correlation between the 
proportion of foreign loans and credit losses, for smaller BHCs the correlation 
coefficient was negative. In what concerns the total sample, it was found a positive 
association between the proportion of foreign loans and reported credit losses in 2008 
(although the coefficient assumes a lower value in comparison to subset I), indicating 
that larger BHCs had a comparatively stronger role in the determination of the existing 
association between this variable and credit losses (which is intuitive, given that credit 
activities in foreign countries are mainly developed by larger BHCs). 
The provisioning ratio of past due and nonaccrual loans was significant for 
smaller BHCs and for the total sample, at the 1% level, and for larger BHCs, although 
only at the 10% level. There isn’t a clear explanation for such dissimilar conclusions 
between larger and smaller BHCs concerning this variable’s statistical significance. 
Nevertheless, estimation results suggest that BHCs with lower provisioning ratios in the 
end of 2007 had indeed to increase their provisions for loan losses at a faster pace than 
BHCs with higher provisioning ratios as of that same date. 
Being audited by one of the “Big Four” auditing firms also proved to have a 
significant impact on credit losses registered in 2008, especially for larger BHCs. 
Conclusions for the total sample demonstrate that in 2008 BHCs audited by one of the 
“Big Four” auditing firms registered credit losses which were higher by 70 basis points 
in comparison to BHCs that weren’t audited by one of those auditing firms. The impact 
of this variable on credit losses was more than 50% higher for larger BHCs in 
comparison to smaller BHCs (78 basis points and 49 basis points for larger BHCs and 
smaller BHCs, respectively). Thus, it was found evidence that the “Big Four” auditing 
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firms seem to have a comparatively higher influence over their clients’ loan loss 
provisioning policies (in comparison to the remaining auditing firms). 
Although this study is focused in BHCs’ credit losses reported in 2008 it is also 
interesting to analyze its historical evolution. Figure 11 illustrates the evolution of 
weighted average credit losses for the total sample as well as for both considered 
subsets for the period between 2004 and 2008
38
. It is interesting to note that for the last 
five years BHCs classified in peers 1 and 2 as of December 31
st
 2008 have 
systematically registered higher credit losses, in comparison to BHCs classified in peers 
3 and 4 as of that same date. The existing gap among both groups has widened 
considerably in the last two years of the covered period, and especially in 2008. In fact, 
between 2004 and 2006, the gap between subset I and subset II ranged between 22 basis 
points and 30 basis points; in 2007, it increased to 58 basis points and in 2008 it has 
reached 139 basis points, which is almost five times higher in comparison to the gap 
observed in 2006. 
Since credit loss figures are weighted average, these conclusions are nevertheless 
influenced by the four largest BHCs, which have incurred in substantial credit losses 
during the 2007-2009 credit crisis. Figure 12 demonstrates that the four largest BHCs 
have systematically incurred in higher credit losses in comparison to the remaining 
BHCs classified in peers 1 and 2, as of December 31
st
 2008, and that the existing gap 
between them has significantly increased after 2006. It is also interesting to note that, 
excluding the four largest BHCs, weighted average credit losses for subset I and subset 
II were actually similar between 2004 and 2007. 
 
  
                                                          
38
 The figures for the total sample and for subset I are obviously similar due to the fact that credit loss 
figures are weighted-average. 
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Figure 11. Evolution of weighted average credit losses. 
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Figure 12. Evolution of weighted average credit losses for BHCs included in subset I. 
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5.2. Hypotheses Tests for Predefined BHCs’ Groups 
 
A set of hypotheses tests was performed after model estimation with the purpose 
of testing whether credit loss experience in 2008 was similar across predefined BHCs’ 
groups. It was used t-tests for differences between means and Mann-Whitney tests for 
differences between medians in order to analyze predefined groups’ measures of central 
tendency. 
The performed hypotheses tests grouped BHCs taking into consideration their size 
and their listing status as of December 31
st
 2008, as well as their geographic location. 
 
Test #1: Credit losses in 2008 were similar for larger BHCs and smaller BHCs. 
This test was based on the two subsets previously defined for model estimation 
(“Subset I” and “Subset II”). It will be tested if the means and the medians of credit 
losses were statistically similar between BHCs classified in peers 1 and 2 as of 
December 31
st
 2008 and BHCs classified in peers 3 and 4 as of that same date. Test #1’s 
specifications are as follows: 
 T-test for differences between means: 
H0: MeanSubset I – MeanSubset II = 0 
H1: MeanSubset I – MeanSubset II <> 0 
 Mann-Whitney test for differences between medians: 
H0: MedianSubset I – MedianSubset II = 0 
H1: MedianSubset I – MedianSubset II <> 0 
Table 7 presents results for Test #1. Considering a significance level of 5% the 
null hypotheses of equal means and equal medians are rejected. For a significance level 
of 1%, only the hypothesis of equal medians is rejected, although the test’s p-value was 
very close to the critical level of 1%. Thus, estimation results point out differences in 
credit loss experience in 2008 between larger BHCs and smaller BHCs, having larger 
BHCs registered comparatively higher credit losses in 2008. These conclusions are 
more pronounced based on the Mann-Whitney test for differences between medians. 
This test’s conclusions confirm the empirical notion underlying the analysis presented 
in the end of the previous section, which suggested that larger BHCs incurred in higher 





Table 7. Hypotheses test results – Test #1. 
“Subset I” relates to BHCs classified as of December 31
st
 2008 in peers 1 and 2, while 
“Subset II” groups BHCs classified as of that same date in peers 3 and 4. 
 
T-Test for Differences Between Means:
Group # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean
Subset I 142 1.63% 1.63% 0.14%
Subset II 207 1.25% 1.25% 0.09%
Variances
1







Mann-Whitney Test for Differences Between Medians:
Group # of Obs. Median Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Subset I 142 1.09% 192.09 27,276.50
Subset II 207 0.82% 163.28 33,798.50
Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z P-Value
12,270.50 33,798.50 -2.621 0.009
1
 Results of Levene's test for equality of variances: F = 4.580; p-value = 0.033.
Considering a significance level of 5% the hypothesis of equal variances is rejected.  
 
Test #2: Credit losses in 2008 were similar for unlisted BHCs and listed BHCs. 
The necessary information to group BHCs according to their listing status as of 
December 31
st
 2008 was gathered from Bloomberg
39
. It will be tested if the means and 
the medians of credit losses were statistically similar between unlisted BHCs and listed 
BHCs as of December 31
st
 2008. Test #2’s specifications are as follows: 
 T-test for differences between means: 
H0: MeanUnlisted – MeanListed = 0 
H1: MeanUnlisted – MeanListed <> 0 
 Mann-Whitney test for differences between medians: 
H0: MedianUnlisted – MedianListed = 0 
H1: MedianUnlisted – MedianListed <> 0 
Table 8 presents results for Test #2. Even for a significance level of 1% the null 
hypotheses of equal means and equal medians are rejected. Thus, estimation results 
show that credit loss experience in 2008 differed between unlisted BHCs and listed 
BHCs, having the latter registered higher credit losses in 2008. It is worth noting test 
#2’s results are comparatively more powerful, suggesting there was a clearer distinction 
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of credit loss experience between unlisted BHCs and listed BHCs (in comparison to test 
#1, which compared credit loss experience between larger and smaller BHCs). 
 
Table 8. Hypotheses test results – Test #2. 
“Unlisted” relates to unlisted BHCs as of December 31
st
 2008, while “Listed” groups 
listed BHCs as of that same date. 
 
T-Test for Differences Between Means:
Group # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean
Unlisted 184 1.18% 1.18% 0.09%
Listed 165 1.66% 1.64% 0.13%
Variances
1







Mann-Whitney Test for Differences Between Medians:
Group # of Obs. Median Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Unlisted 184 0.77% 158.95 29,246.50
Listed 165 1.17% 192.90 31,828.50
Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z P-Value
12,226.50 29,246.50 -3.139 0.002
1
 Results of Levene's test for equality of variances: F = 9.897; p-value = 0.002.
The hypothesis of equal variances is rejected, even for a significance level of 1%.  
 
Test #3: Credit losses in 2008 were similar among BHCs regardless of their 
geographic location. 
This test was based on each BHC’s geographic location, considering BHCs that 
were assumed to develop their activities at a regional level or at a state level. It will be 
tested if the means and the medians of credit losses were statistically similar for BHCs 
developing their activities in distinct geographic regions. Considered regions are, in 
accordance with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Regions, Midwest, Northeast, South and 
West. Test #3’s specifications are as follows: 
 T-test for differences between means: 
H0: MeanRegion i – MeanRegion j = 0 
H1: MeanRegion i – MeanRegion j <> 0 
 Mann-Whitney test for differences between medians: 
H0: MedianRegion i – MedianRegion j = 0 
H1: MedianRegion i – MedianRegion j <> 0 
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Table 9 presents results for Test #3. Test results show that credit loss experience 
in 2008 was, in general, different for BHCs developing their activities in distinct 
geographic regions, especially considering the results of Mann-Whitney tests for 
differences between medians. In fact, for a significance level of 5%, the null hypothesis 
of equal medians is not rejected only for the test comparing credit loss experience of 
BHCs located in the Midwest and in the South. Still for a significance level of 5%, the 
null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected for the tests comparing credit loss 
experience of (i) BHCs located in the Midwest and in the South and of (ii) BHCs 
located in the Midwest and in the West. It is worth noting that for BHCs located in the 
Midwest and in the South, test results for the null hypotheses of equal means and equal 
medians were similar, whilst test results for the null hypotheses of equal means and 
equal medians were clearly different for BHCs located in the Midwest and in the West. 
In addition, Test #3’s results show that (i) credit losses in 2008 of BHCs 
developing their activities in the West were higher than the ones of BHCs located in 
other regions (especially considering results of Mann-Whitney tests for differences 
between medians) and (ii) credit losses in 2008 of BHCs developing their activities in 
the Northeast were lower than the ones of BHCs located in other regions. 
 
Table 9. Hypotheses test results – Test #3. 
P-values already consider results of Levene’s tests for equality of variances. 
 
Descriptive Statistics:
Group # of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean
Midwest 106 1.63% 1.11% 1.74% 0.17%
Northeast 62 0.57% 0.47% 0.49% 0.06%
South 119 1.27% 0.88% 1.27% 0.12%
West 58 2.04% 1.85% 1.31% 0.17%





South 1.782*    -5.332*** n.a.
West -1.545       -8.018*** -3.707*** n.a.





South -1.863*    -5.225*** n.a.
West -2.848*** -7.457*** -4.610*** n.a.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
NortheastMidwest South West






This study analyzes the determinants of credit losses experienced by North 
American BHCs in 2008. The analysis is based on BHCs’ historical financial data and 
on information collected from recognized North American public entities. It was chosen 
provision for loan and lease losses as a percentage of the yearly average loan portfolio 
as the dependent variable. Determinants of BHCs’ incurred credit losses in 2008 
included external and bank-specific factors. As far as the author is aware, some of them 
are a novelty of this study, namely the proportion of restructured loans, retained credit 
exposure in securitization activities and the identification of BHCs’ auditing firms. 
Concerning external factors, credit losses were found to be sensitive to GDP 
growth in larger BHCs, while smaller BHCs’ credit losses were clearly influenced by 
housing market price evolution. Sensitivity of smaller BHCs to housing market price 
evolution is coherent with the fact that higher credit losses in 2008 have been incurred 
by BHCs operating in the states more affected by the housing crisis. The author is aware 
of the limitations resulting from the assumptions taken to consider whether each BHC 
developed its activities at a national, regional or state level. The imposition of 
assumptions resulted from the absence of available public information concerning 
BHCs’ loan portfolio geographic distribution. 
Results of this study point to a clear risk-return relation – higher credit losses were 
associated to loan portfolios with higher average spreads, higher shares of construction 
and land-related loans (which are typically riskier assets) and higher proportions of 
restructured loans. The latter variable proved to be statistically significant only for 
larger BHCs. This is an interesting result, as it can sign that credit restructuring may 
have been used by some of the larger BHCs as a tool to hide or delay the development 
of nonperforming loans. Further investigation should be pursued, depending on whether 
adequate information to evaluate this issue is available. 
Another relevant finding of this study refers to the impact of foreign loans on 
BHCs’ credit losses reported in 2008. While for larger BHCs higher proportions of 
foreign loans resulted in higher credit losses, for smaller BHCs estimation results show 
that foreign loans seem to have worked as an effective tool for portfolio diversification. 
This result raises an interesting question about larger BHCs’ credit activities: 
historically how does compare the profitability of domestic credit activities and foreign 
credit activities for those BHCs? Further investigation may focus on the analysis of the 
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historical contribution of foreign credit activities to larger BHCs’ profits and compare it 
with domestic credit activities’ performance. 
This study also demonstrated that smaller BHCs with lower provisioning ratios 
for their delinquent loans as of December 2007 were forced to increase their provisions 
for loan losses at a faster pace in 2008. Thus, this result indicates that banking 
regulators should be aware whenever similar financial institutions (in terms of their loan 
portfolios’ risk profiles) show clearly dissimilar provisioning ratios among it selves. 
The eventual greater influence of the major auditing firms proved to be a 
significant determinant of credit losses incurred by North American BHCs in 2008, 
having estimation results shown that larger BHCs’ credit losses were more sensitive to 
this variable. Concerning retained credit exposure in securitization activities, results 
were found to be rather ambiguous. 
Other important results from this study refer to the fact that larger and listed 
BHCs incurred in higher credit losses in 2008 comparatively to smaller and unlisted 
BHCs, respectively. Moreover, BHCs developing their activities in the West registered 
comparatively higher credit losses, while BHCs developing their activities in the 
Northeast incurred in comparatively lower credit losses. Are larger and listed BHCs 
more prone to engage in riskier credit activities in order to maximize their profits? Or, 
did comparatively higher credit losses incurred by those BHCs in 2008 constitute an 
exception? These questions should also be subject to further investigation. 
As a final remark, there are several alternative proxies that could have been used 
as measures to assess BHCs’ credit loss experience in 2008. Concerning this matter, 
Hess, Grimes and Holmes (2008b) have promoted a discussion on the potential credit 
loss experience proxies and one of their main conclusions is that provisions for loan 
losses are only partially followed by corresponding charge-offs for Australasian banks. 
Therefore, further investigation may consider analyzing if the observed loan loss 
provisioning levels during the 2007-2009 credit crisis were indeed followed by 
corresponding charge-offs afterwards and/or if there were abnormal recovery levels of 
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Appendix 1. List of BHCs used in this study. Data as of December 31
st
 2008; figures 
are in USD Millions. 
 







Provision for Loan 
and Lease Losses
1073757 Bank of America Corporation 1 Listed 937,731 26,923
1120754 Wells Fargo & Company 1 Listed 870,143 15,492
1039502 JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1 Listed 738,022 21,237
1951350 Citigroup Inc. 1 Listed 694,080 33,674
1119794 U.S. Bancorp 1 Listed 184,651 3,096
1131787 Suntrust Banks, Inc. 1 Listed 128,680 2,474
1132449 Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 1 Unlisted 109,465 1,929
1074156 BB&T Corporation 1 Listed 97,095 1,423
3242838 Regions Financial Corporation 1 Listed 97,034 2,057
1070345 Fifth Third Bancorp 1 Listed 82,806 4,560
1068025 Keycorp 1 Listed 75,728 1,835
1025608 Bancwest Corporation 1 Unlisted 54,267 743
1249196 TD Banknorth Inc. 1 Unlisted 50,584 334
1199844 Comerica Incorporated 1 Listed 49,770 686
1378434 Unionbancal Corporation 1 Listed 48,848 515
3594612 Marshall & Ilsley Corporation 1 Listed 48,782 2,038
1037003 M&T Bank Corporation 1 Listed 48,213 412
3587146 Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, The 1 Listed 42,966 182
1027004 Zions Bancorporation 1 Listed 41,224 649
1068191 Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 1 Listed 40,561 1,080
1078529 BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc. 1 Unlisted 37,918 476
1245415 Harris Financial Corp. 1 Unlisted 36,608 782
2816906 Taunus Corporation 1 Unlisted 35,466 41
1199611 Northern Trust Corporation 1 Listed 30,530 105
1078846 Synovus Financial Corp. 1 Listed 27,459 700
2132932 New York Community Bancorp, Inc. 1 Listed 22,098 8
1826056 RBC Bancorporation (USA) 1 Unlisted 21,237 369
1094640 First Horizon National Corporation 1 Listed 20,996 1,080
1080465 Colonial Bancgroup, Inc., The 1 Listed 16,287 729
1199563 Associated Banc-Corp 1 Listed 16,122 202
2307280 Utrecht-America Holdings, Inc. 1 Unlisted 13,861 56
1130780 FBOP Corporation 1 Unlisted 13,712 140
2389941 TCF Financial Corporation 1 Listed 13,173 192
1883693 BOK Financial Corporation 1 Listed 12,760 208
1027518 City National Corporation 1 Listed 12,220 124
1117129 Fulton Financial Corporation 1 Listed 11,965 120
1075612 First Citizens Bancshares, Inc. 1 Listed 11,562 66
1049341 Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1 Listed 11,472 109
1020902 First National Of Nebraska, Inc. 1 Unlisted 11,426 249
1048773 Valley National Bancorp 1 Listed 10,055 29
1141599 South Financial Group, Inc., The 1 Listed 9,987 344
1097614 Bancorpsouth, Inc. 1 Listed 9,749 56
1888193 Wilmington Trust Corporation 1 Listed 9,568 116
1117156 Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. 1 Listed 9,540 64
1111435 State Street Corporation 1 Listed 9,113 -
1079740 Whitney Holding Corporation 1 Listed 8,942 135
1205688 Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc. 1 Unlisted 8,939 282
1102367 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 1 Listed 8,736 38
2694814 UCBH Holdings, Inc. 1 Listed 8,480 223
1118797 First Banks, Inc. 1 Unlisted 8,373 368
2734233 East West Bancorp, Inc. 1 Listed 8,070 231
1839319 Privatebancorp, Inc. 1 Listed 7,941 190
2260406 Wintrust Financial Corporation 1 Listed 7,630 57
1095674 Arvest Bank Group, Inc. 1 Unlisted 7,573 62
1843080 Cathay General Bancorp 1 Listed 7,340 104
1070804 Firstmerit Corporation 1 Listed 7,333 59
3212091 New York Private Bank & Trust Corporation 1 Unlisted 7,271 47
1079562 Trustmark Corporation 2 Listed 6,866 76
1025309 Bank of Hawaii Corporation 1 Listed 6,428 61




Appendix 1 (cont.). List of BHCs used in this study. Data as of December 31
st
 2008; 
figures are in USD Millions. 
 







Provision for Loan 
and Lease Losses
1090987 MB Financial, Inc. 2 Listed 6,085 126
2747644 Umpqua Holdings Corporation 2 Listed 6,058 108
1076217 United Bankshares, Inc. 2 Listed 5,954 25
1094314 Central Bancompany 2 Unlisted 5,886 31
1104231 International Bancshares Corporation 1 Listed 5,799 20
3005332 F.N.B. Corporation 2 Listed 5,726 72
1020180 Bremer Financial Corporation 2 Unlisted 5,695 42
1029884 Pacific Capital Bancorp 2 Listed 5,635 218
2477754 Investors Bancorp, Mhc 2 Listed 5,635 18
1249347 United Community Banks, Inc. 2 Listed 5,603 184
1031449 SVB Financial Group 2 Listed 5,399 101
1208184 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc. 2 Listed 5,264 70
1075911 First Citizens Bancorporation, Inc. 2 Unlisted 4,954 32
1098303 Old National Bancorp 2 Listed 4,711 51
1123670 First Interstate Bancsystem, Inc. 2 Unlisted 4,682 33
1247334 Capitol Bancorp Ltd. 2 Listed 4,653 82
2706735 Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc. 2 Listed 4,480 27
3133637 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 2 Listed 4,479 15
1490701 Johnson Financial Group, Inc. 2 Unlisted 4,466 22
1142336 Park National Corporation 2 Listed 4,391 70
1071306 First Commonwealth Financial Corporation 2 Listed 4,366 23
1049828 UMB Financial Corporation 1 Listed 4,358 18
1247633 Provident Bankshares Corporation 2 Listed 4,285 38
1199732 Irwin Financial Corporation 2 Listed 4,244 331
2107707 Dickinson Financial Corporation II 2 Unlisted 4,214 158
1086533 Hancock Holding Company 2 Listed 4,210 37
2003975 Glacier Bancorp, Inc. 2 Listed 4,053 28
2349815 Western Alliance Bancorporation 2 Unlisted 4,021 68
1060627 Firstbank Holding Company 2 Unlisted 3,999 33
1022764 Central Pacific Financial Corp. 2 Listed 3,950 172
2894230 Discount Bancorp, Inc. 2 Unlisted 3,937 18
2875332 Pacwest Bancorp 2 Unlisted 3,925 49
1427239 Eastern Bank Corporation 2 Unlisted 3,895 40
2126977 Banner Corporation 2 Listed 3,886 63
1200393 Corus Bankshares, Inc. 2 Listed 3,836 588
1053272 Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc. 2 Unlisted 3,771 10
2291914 Iberiabank Corporation 2 Listed 3,767 13
1105425 Sterling Bancshares, Inc. 2 Listed 3,745 29
1029222 CVB Financial Corp. 2 Listed 3,683 27
1208559 First Merchants Corporation 2 Listed 3,677 28
1031346 Frontier Financial Corporation 2 Listed 3,666 122
1208661 Amcore Financial, Inc. 2 Listed 3,656 203
1117192 Harleysville National Corporation 2 Listed 3,635 16
1139279 NBT Bancorp Inc. 2 Listed 3,593 27
1070448 Wesbanco, Inc. 2 Listed 3,563 33
1245620 Bank Leumi Le-Israel Corporation 2 Unlisted 3,562 15
1109599 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc. 2 Listed 3,530 10
1071397 S & T Bancorp, Inc. 2 Listed 3,526 13
2925657 Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc. 2 Listed 3,344 11
1136661 Ocean Bankshares, Inc. 2 Unlisted 3,326 188
2900261 Hanmi Financial Corporation 2 Listed 3,291 73
1199602 1st Source Corporation 2 Listed 3,265 17
1029464 W.T.B. Financial Corporation 2 Unlisted 3,196 55
1203602 First Busey Corporation 2 Listed 3,159 98
1247893 Plains Capital Corporation 2 Unlisted 3,134 13
2495039 Taylor Capital Group, Inc. 2 Listed 3,105 144
1048867 Community Bank System, Inc. 2 Listed 3,097 8
1135972 Mercantil Commercebank Holding Corporation 2 Unlisted 3,035 77
1201934 Chemical Financial Corporation 2 Listed 2,933 49





Appendix 1 (cont.). List of BHCs used in this study. Data as of December 31
st
 2008; 
figures are in USD Millions. 
 







Provision for Loan 
and Lease Losses
3114654 Imperial Capital Bancorp, Inc 2 Unlisted 2,755 78
1133286 Bancfirst Corporation 2 Listed 2,724 11
1139242 Sun Bancorp, Inc 2 Listed 2,703 20
1364071 First State Bancorporation 2 Listed 2,676 72
1071276 First Financial Bancorp 2 Listed 2,651 19
1136803 Independent Bank Corp. 2 Listed 2,622 11
3012554 Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc. 2 Listed 2,570 1
1064278 Intrust Financial Corporation 2 Unlisted 2,568 8
1098844 Renasant Corporation 2 Listed 2,538 23
1062621 Southwest Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 2,512 19
1209828 Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc. 2 Listed 2,465 72
1248304 Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc. 2 Listed 2,452 33
1201925 Independent Bank Corporation 3 Listed 2,436 68
1132654 Integra Bank Corporation 2 Listed 2,432 66
1136670 Riverside Banking Company 2 Unlisted 2,390 81
1206546 Heartland Financial Usa, Inc. 2 Listed 2,389 29
1025541 Westamerica Bancorporation 2 Listed 2,338 3
1204627 Metropolitan Bank Group, Inc. 2 Unlisted 2,321 11
1070644 Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 2,318 11
1097025 Republic Bancorp, Inc. 2 Listed 2,300 16
1133437 SCBT Financial Corporation 3 Listed 2,300 11
2856377 Virginia Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 2,279 25
1029428 First Regional Bancorp 3 Listed 2,274 92
1206911 Old Second Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 2,265 19
2502049 Stellarone Corporation 3 Unlisted 2,250 21
1401109 American Chartered Bancorp, Inc. 2 Unlisted 2,192 36
2078816 Columbia Banking System, Inc. 2 Listed 2,192 41
1076431 First Bancorp 3 Listed 2,183 10
1133277 Green Bankshares, Inc. 3 Listed 2,175 53
1061679 Alpine Banks of Colorado 3 Unlisted 2,084 8
1200692 Parkway Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 2,082 8
1053580 Farmers & Merchants Investment, Inc. 3 Unlisted 2,078 5
2961879 Nara Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 2,065 49
1029893 West Coast Bancorp 3 Listed 2,039 47
1199974 First American Bank Corporation 3 Unlisted 2,027 40
1404799 Lakeland Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 2,010 24
1050712 Valley View Bancshares, Inc. 2 Unlisted 2,002 6
1107205 Amarillo National Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,992 18
1097089 Bank of the Ozarks Inc. 2 Listed 1,992 19
1249598 Orion Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,988 14
1060328 Cobiz Financial Inc. 3 Listed 1,988 40
1209109 Mainsource Financial Group, Inc. 3 Listed 1,966 21
2303910 Enterprise Financial Services Corp 3 Listed 1,948 22
1137770 Woodforest Financial Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,948 11
1201671 BTC Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,930 22
3142349 Midamerica Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,930 22
1848003 Cascade Bancorp 3 Listed 1,924 85
2244358 Security Bank Corporation 3 Listed 1,922 128
1085509 Capital City Bank Group, Inc. 3 Listed 1,921 32
1094828 Simmons First National Corporation 3 Listed 1,918 9
1491409 Home Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,916 27
2611718 Amboy Bancorporation 3 Unlisted 1,884 15
1971693 Union Bankshares Corporation 3 Listed 1,878 10
1245590 Standard Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,863 11
2608763 Mercantile Bank Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,830 21
1115349 Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,818 5
1208906 Lakeland Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,815 10
3101784 Liberty Bancshares, Inc 3 Unlisted 1,803 19
2367921 Tompkins Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,799 5
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1076262 City Holding Company 3 Listed 1,790 10
3254952 Guaranty Bancorp 3 Listed 1,787 34
2033226 South Plains Financial, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,784 18
1026801 Fremont Bancorporation 3 Unlisted 1,750 14
2634696 Macatawa Bank Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,738 37
2339133 Great Southern Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,722 52
3003178 Center Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,691 15
1417333 State Bankshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,682 13
1427501 Community Bankshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,680 33
1048803 Hudson Valley Holding Corp. 3 Unlisted 1,678 11
1048997 Smithtown Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,677 3
2049302 Intervest Bancshares Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,677 11
1080595 Community Bancshares Of Mississippi, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,677 3
1082067 Ameris Bancorp 3 Listed 1,656 35
1085013 Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida 3 Listed 1,650 89
1364110 Vineyard National Bancorp 3 Unlisted 1,643 109
1132104 First South Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,617 21
1199992 Shorebank Corporation, The 3 Unlisted 1,610 25
1031627 Americanwest Bancorporation 3 Listed 1,598 89
1133473 FNB United Corp. 3 Unlisted 1,588 27
1067804 Hillcrest Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,576 36
1030170 Trico Bancshares 3 Listed 1,563 21
3047109 New Frontier Bancorp 3 Unlisted 1,547 38
1102312 First Financial Bankshares, Inc. 2 Listed 1,545 8
1096505 First Security Bancorp 3 Unlisted 1,542 4
2158156 Central Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,537 8
2942702 Sturm Financial Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,514 21
1138012 Banctrust Financial Group, Inc. 3 Listed 1,503 15
2687795 Cambridge Financial Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,496 3
1097306 Bancplus Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,491 7
1130249 Camden National Corporation 3 Listed 1,483 4
1058398 Durant Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,482 8
1245291 Hills Bancorporation 3 Unlisted 1,478 12
2807614 Pennsylvania Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,464 7
1204560 First Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,461 8
1208595 First Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,455 8
1116609 Univest Corporation Of Pennsylvania 3 Listed 1,437 9
1063262 First Olathe Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,436 22
2858951 Bancorp, Inc., The 3 Listed 1,432 13
1081118 Fidelity Southern Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,410 37
2532402 Sinopac Bancorp 3 Unlisted 1,409 29
1141348 Minnwest Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,395 12
1492219 First Mutual Bancorp of Illinois, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,377 76
3102585 Temecula Valley Bancorp Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,373 39
2705943 Cnlbancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,361 17
2233950 Olney Bancshares of Texas, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,347 4
1249730 S. Y. Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,338 4
1059715 American National Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,335 21
3124381 Community Bancorp 3 Listed 1,332 66
1249712 Porter Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,330 5
2344799 Metrocorp Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,325 13
1099328 Mercantile Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,321 24
1141647 Star Financial Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,308 6
1100037 Cadence Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,308 29
2981831 Southern Community Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,296 8
1098732 Farmers Capital Bank Corporation 3 Listed 1,296 5
1207431 Stark Bank Group, Ltd. 3 Unlisted 1,295 26
2509413 Rockville Financial Mhc, Inc. 3 Listed 1,292 2
2592714 Hometown Community Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,285 -
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2682996 Cardinal Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,282 5
2345068 Legacytexas Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,276 8
1399765 1867 Western Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,268 5
1109991 North American Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,267 6
2332750 Capital Corp of the West 3 Listed 1,255 55
2326629 ANB Corporation, The 3 Unlisted 1,252 6
2867542 Premierwest Bancorp 3 Listed 1,243 23
2741156 Capital Bank Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,240 4
2568362 Cascade Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,239 7
1121229 Dacotah Banks, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,235 2
1245705 West Suburban Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,234 10
1039454 Sterling Bancorp 3 Listed 1,229 8
1919770 Big Sandy Holding Company 3 Unlisted 1,224 8
1056161 Trinity Capital Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,224 8
2634874 Heritage Commerce Corp 3 Listed 1,224 16
2457943 TIB Financial Corp. 3 Unlisted 1,203 26
2125813 QCR Holdings, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,197 11
1123072 Fishback Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,197 8
1247679 Summit Financial Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,193 16
2306649 Premier Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,191 40
2343662 Horizon Financial Corp. 3 Listed 1,189 27
1095982 First M & F Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,159 20
1966671 Whitaker Bank Corporation Of Kentucky 3 Unlisted 1,159 9
1209145 Bridgeview Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,157 13
2781910 Farmers & Merchants Bancorp 3 Unlisted 1,157 8
1075984 Palmetto Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,155 6
1134322 Firstbank Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,146 8
2325350 Lone Star National Bancshares--Texas, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,143 11
1207486 Marquette National Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,135 6
3434624 Banorte Usa Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,121 5
1132672 First United Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,120 13
1081873 Community Bankshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,110 25
2066886 Rogers Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,109 15
1205398 Bank of Highland Park Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,107 3
2704562 Danvers Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,107 4
1138861 State Bancorp, Inc. 3 Listed 1,104 17
1032464 Financial Institutions, Inc. 3 Listed 1,103 7
3186585 Peoplesbancorp, Mhc 3 Unlisted 1,099 0
1048812 Arrow Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,097 2
2697347 FVNB Corp. 3 Unlisted 1,088 4
1210066 West Bancorporation, Inc. 3 Listed 1,086 17
1130865 Suffolk Bancorp 3 Listed 1,084 2
1070578 Peoples Bancorp Inc. 3 Listed 1,082 28
2004141 Wilson Bank Holding Company 3 Unlisted 1,081 7
1133503 Canandaigua National Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,077 4
1123915 Klein Financial, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,076 5
1054514 Landrum Company 3 Unlisted 1,068 7
2896458 Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,063 5
1126046 Stockman Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 1,061 3
1106879 Broadway Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,053 5
1055315 F & M Bancorporation Inc. 3 Unlisted 1,049 7
2651590 Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corporation 3 Listed 1,043 2
2322304 First Mariner Bancorp 3 Unlisted 1,022 15
2291624 Bank of Kentucky Financial Corporation, The 3 Unlisted 1,019 5
1245068 Southside Bancshares, Incorporated 3 Listed 1,007 14
2038409 Hawthorn Bancshares, Inc 3 Unlisted 996 8
2836801 First Security Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 994 16
1491360 First Bank Corp 3 Unlisted 994 8
1938865 Southeastern Bank Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 991 9
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1103177 American State Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 984 8
1126475 Anchor Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 981 12
1202052 NEB Corporation 3 Unlisted 980 3
1128358 Frandsen Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 973 4
1133932 First Bancorp, Inc., The 3 Unlisted 972 5
1249002 Fidelity Bancshares (N.C.), Inc. 3 Unlisted 966 2
1134498 Inwood Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 959 1
2560263 First National Community Bancorp Inc 3 Unlisted 958 3
1066713 Sunflower Banks, Inc. 3 Unlisted 953 2
1085170 Colony Bankcorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 944 13
1143481 Bank of Granite Corporation 3 Listed 940 30
1083934 Pab Bankshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 937 18
2976396 Sierra Bancorp 3 Listed 930 19
2907822 MBT Financial Corp. 3 Unlisted 923 18
2835514 Boiling Springs, MHC 3 Unlisted 909 7
1140510 Alliance Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 902 6
2388878 Beacon Bancorp 3 Unlisted 900 2
2149622 National Bank of Indianapolis Corporation, The 3 Unlisted 891 7
1098620 German American Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 884 4
1136139 Vist Financial Corp. 3 Unlisted 880 5
2868129 Centerstate Banks of Florida, Inc. 3 Unlisted 879 7
1209136 Horizon Bancorp 3 Unlisted 877 8
1427275 Stearns Financial Services, Inc. 3 Unlisted 847 48
2378440 Columbia Bancorp 3 Unlisted 839 43
1023239 Merchants Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 838 1
2869733 Pacific Mercantile Bancorp 3 Unlisted 834 16
1135824 Emprise Financial Corporation 3 Unlisted 833 2
1111088 Century Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 825 4
2947882 National Bancshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 815 5
1057588 Commerce Bank And Trust Holding Company 3 Unlisted 809 9
1207600 Princeton National Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 788 3
1081239 Crews Banking Corporation 3 Unlisted 784 9
1398807 Republic First Bancorp, Inc. 4 Unlisted 775 7
3186576 Citizens National Banc Corp. 3 Unlisted 741 2
2066868 Banc Ed Corp., The 3 Unlisted 740 2
1143623 Citizens and Northern Corporation 3 Unlisted 736 1
1066209 Lauritzen Corporation 3 Unlisted 728 8
1126354 Minnehaha Banshares, Inc. 3 Unlisted 728 7
1202708 Baylake Corp. 3 Unlisted 716 18
1075694 Southern Bancshares (N.C.), Inc. 3 Unlisted 711 2
2293329 Prosperity Banking Company, The 3 Unlisted 704 25
1143762 Founders Group, Inc. 3 Unlisted 700 18
2324429 Royal Bancshares of Pennsylvania, Inc. 3 Unlisted 672 22
1048764 Center Bancorp, Inc. 3 Unlisted 670 2
1130584 RCB Holding Company, Inc. 3 Unlisted 654 2
2803719 Midwest Bankcentre, Inc. 3 Unlisted 650 3
1204814 SBC, Incorporated 4 Unlisted 642 14
3100358 Florida Community Banks, Inc. 4 Unlisted 598 60






Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and for bank-specific 
determinants of BHCs’ credit losses in 2008 – Subset I. 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis # of Obs.
PLLL08 1.63% 1.09% 13.31% 0.00% 1.63% 3.216 18.014 142
SAIRLL04-07 2.83% 2.73% 6.28% -1.10% 0.88% 0.136 4.828 142
LPGR05-07 11.41% 9.54% 49.53% -3.52% 8.65% 1.677 4.345 142
PCLDOLL07 15.18% 12.78% 82.95% 0.00% 11.59% 1.853 7.475 142
PCL07 6.75% 4.00% 27.12% 0.03% 6.60% 1.048 0.079 142
PRLL07 0.11% 0.00% 4.91% 0.00% 0.54% 7.189 54.498 142
AT1CR04-07 10.81% 10.45% 29.23% -4.68% 2.94% 1.030 15.431 142
PRCES08 0.08% 0.00% 2.75% 0.00% 0.37% 5.773 35.294 142
PFL07 1.97% 0.00% 55.23% 0.00% 7.24% 5.263 30.579 142
PDNALPR07 91.69% 66.70% 1019.12% 2.68% 108.30% 5.970 43.934 142
GWIL08 0.2183 - 1.0000 - 0.4146 1.378 (0.102) 142
AF08 0.7606 1.0000 1.0000 - 0.4283 (1.234) (0.484) 142
 
 
Appendix 2 (cont.). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and for bank-
specific determinants of BHCs’ credit losses in 2008 – Subset II. 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis # of Obs.
PLLL08 1.25% 0.82% 8.54% 0.00% 1.25% 2.399 7.524 207
SAIRLL04-07 3.22% 3.13% 5.91% 1.71% 0.67% 0.658 1.367 207
LPGR05-07 13.78% 11.81% 55.88% -8.38% 9.76% 1.604 4.548 207
PCLDOLL07 19.48% 16.66% 75.21% 0.34% 13.44% 1.118 1.370 207
PCL07 5.21% 3.12% 51.25% 0.02% 6.79% 3.047 13.207 207
PRLL07 0.09% 0.00% 4.61% 0.00% 0.38% 9.195 100.052 207
AT1CR04-07 11.55% 11.08% 33.64% 7.30% 2.86% 2.965 17.372 207
PRCES08 0.03% 0.00% 6.12% 0.00% 0.43% 14.103 201.154 207
PFL07 0.11% 0.00% 4.47% 0.00% 0.53% 6.155 41.274 207
PDNALPR07 92.08% 65.32% 750.31% 9.68% 95.02% 3.831 18.576 207
GWIL08 0.0821 - 1.0000 - 0.2752 3.066 7.474 207





Appendix 3. Correlation coefficients between the dependent variable (BHCs’ credit 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3 (cont.). Correlation coefficients between the dependent variable (BHCs’ 
credit losses) and potential explanatory variables. This table reports to Subset I, which 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3 (cont.). Correlation coefficients between the dependent variable (BHCs’ 
credit losses) and potential explanatory variables. This table reports to Subset II, which 
includes BHCs classified in peers 3 and 4 as of December 31
st
 2008. 
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